








Legislating Worker Justice: 





Ruth Kélia Castel-Branco 
 
 



















Submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Masters of 
Development Studies. School of the Built Environment and Development Studies, 
University of KwaZulu-Natal. 
 
Durban, November 2012  
	  
	   i	  
ABSTRACT 
Paid domestic work is the most important occupation for urban Mozambican women after 
self-employment. Domestic workers perform the reproductive and productive functions 
necessary to keep households running and the economy growing. Despite the importance 
of this sector, it is characterised by low wages, long hours, rigorous schedules, and 
vulnerability to abuse. In 2008, Mozambique’s National Assembly passed Decree 
40/2008, extending labour protections to domestic workers. There is significant debate 
however about whether labour protection can transform working conditions in such an 
intimate sector. Domestic work takes place in isolation, behind the closed doors and high 
walls of private homes; it consists of intimate tasks, adding a personalness to the 
employment relationship; and working conditions are negotiated one-on-one with 
employers.  
 
Drawing on historical research, primary observations and semi-structured interviews with 
key informants and domestic workers in Maputo’s central city, this study discusses the 
opportunities and limitations of legislating worker justice in an intimate profession. It 
explores how the institutional and regulatory framework both enables and prevents 
improvements in working conditions; how domestic workers leverage these institutions to 
advance their interests; and the informal strategies and tactics they use concurrently. 
 
The study suggests that Decree 40/2008 has had limited direct impact on working 
conditions. Its ambiguous language, poor dissemination, and weak regulatory structure, 
combined with the precarious nature of Maputo’s labour market and entrenched power 
relations between workers and employers, mean that domestic workers exhibit high levels 
of accommodation or patience, preferring to wait for conditions to improve or better 
options to surface, than to make outright demands from employers. However, this study 
also suggests Decree 40/2008 has galvanised domestic worker organising, creating a 
focus of mobilisation and advocacy with the potential to profoundly affect working 
conditions in this sector. In the context of a fractured labour movement however, 
domestic worker organising has become a battleground for autonomy, power, and 
resources. It is still too early to know whether domestic workers will ultimately benefit.  
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Every morning, tens of thousands of domestic workers make the long trip from Maputo’s 
working-class suburbs to the middle and upper income neighbourhoods of the cement 
city1. Urban sprawl, increased congestion and an inadequate public transport system have 
transformed this daily commute “across the boundaries of race and class” (Dill 1994), 
into a costly struggle. Fearful of arriving late, they set out at dawn, hoping to secure a 
spot on the packed minibuses that carry this “undervalued and essential” workforce to the 
city (Chen 2011, 168). Others, live-in domestic workers, are already up, sweeping the 
yard, heating the bath water or taking care of the baby while madam gets ready for work. 
As apartment lights flicker on and the city awakens, domestic workers are there to greet 
it.  
 
Bound up in Mozambique’s history of colonisation and forced labour, paid domestic 
work has become a hallmark of modern urban living. Amidst a crumbling public care 
system, domestic workers perform the reproductive and productive functions necessary to 
keep households running and the economy churning. The casualisation of labour, 
combined with the rapid entry of women into the labour market, has fuelled the growth of 
this sector. Today, domestic work is the most important occupation for urban 
Mozambican women after self-employment, and 60 per cent of domestic workers are 
clustered in and around the capital city, Maputo (INE 2007). 
 
Maputo’s domestic workers are young and old, urban residents and rural migrants, high 
school graduates or illiterate, male or female, but mostly female (INE 2007). They work 
in the homes of millionaires and minimum wage workers, in mansions and informal 
settlements for Mozambicans and expatriates. Yet despite its heterogeneous nature, 
domestic work is characterised by low wages, long hours, rigorous schedules, humiliating 
tasks, unhealthy working conditions, and vulnerability to abuse (Chipenembe 2010).  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 The cement city refers the area of the city of Maputo, where Portuguese settlers previously lived. This 
area tends to have access to better infrastructure, and employers tend to be better off than in  the suburbs. 
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In 2008, Mozambique’s Council of Ministers approved Decree 40/2008, extending labour 
protections to domestic workers for the first time since independence. According to the 
Council of Ministers “domestic work is an extremely important sector in Mozambique, 
regarding the number of jobs it generates, as well as its social and economic 
implications” (Boletim da República 2008, 2). The approval of Decree 40/2008 reflects a 
global resurgence of interest among policy makers, elected officials and the labour 
movement, in formalising informal work generally, and domestic work in particular 
(Takirambudde 1995).  
 
In June 2011, the International Labour Conference of the International Labour 
Organisation (ILO) adopted Convention 189 and Recommendation 201. Convention 189 
outlines legally binding international labour standards for domestic work including a 
minimum wage, the right to payment in cash, occupational health and safety standards, 
social security, paid time off, and access to the legal courts system (Albin and 
Mantouvalou 2012). This historic legislation is the culmination of a decade of 
transnational mobilisation, negotiation and compromise between state, business, union 
and domestic workers’ representatives (Bonner 2010; Blackett 2011; Varia 2011). The 12 
by 12 Campaign, launched by the International Trade Union Confederation (ITUC) in 
collaboration with among others, the International Domestic Workers’ Network (IDWN) 
and the African Domestic Workers’ Network (ADWN), seeks to secure 12 ratifications 
by the end of 2012. So far, Uruguay, the Philippines, Mauritius and Nicaragua have 
ratified the convention.  
 
There is significant debate however, about whether labour protections can actually 
transform domestic workers’ conditions (Blackett 2011). Some argue that they can. 
Labour protections reframe domestic work as skilled employment, made up of clearly 
defined tasks. They transform the often highly exploitative maternalistic employee-
employer relationship into one governed by contracts, rights, and responsibilities. They 
facilitate domestic workers’ individual and collective actions, providing legal protections 
against retribution from employers (Hobden 2010; ILO 2011; Albin and Mantouvalou 
2012).  
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A second group suggest that labour protections have little impact on domestic workers. 
Domestic work takes place behind the high walls of private homes. It is intimate work, 
and conditions are most frequently negotiated directly between employers and 
employees. Limited enforcement mechanisms, institutionalised power relationships, and 
the isolated nature of this sector curtail the impact of labour regulations (Fish 2006; King 
2007; Ronconi 2008; Du Preez 2010).  
 
A third group warn that labour protections can actually be detrimental to domestic 
workers. In South Africa, minimum wages triggered the casualisation of this sector, 
reducing hours and intensifying workloads as workers were forced to contract with 
multiple employers (Hertz 2005). Furthermore, as contractual rights and responsibilities 
replace the intimate employee-employer relationship, domestic workers may find that 
they have less flexibility to negotiate working conditions. Formalisation therefore, can 
disempower workers by undermining one of their main practices of power - the 
manipulation of intimacy (Ally 2010). 
 
This study provides a critical analysis of the formalisation of paid domestic work in 
Maputo, Mozambique. Based on early indications of the impact of Decree 40/2008 on 
working conditions, it discusses the opportunities and limitations of legislating worker 
justice in an intimate profession. It specifically explores the following questions: 
 
1. What is the institutional context for the regulation and protection of domestic 
work in Maputo, and how has it evolved over time? 
2. How does the current institutional framework - specifically, the labour courts, 
inspectorate, conciliation and mediation centres, legal service providers, training 
and placement agencies and workers’ organisations - enable or prevent 
improvements in working conditions?  
3. How has Decree 40/2008 affected the formal and informal strategies domestic 
workers use to negotiate with employers? 
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This first chapter provides an introduction to the study. The second chapter reviews the 
literature on the formalisation of domestic work, the opportunities and limitations of 
legislating labour protections in this intimate sector, the relationship between state action 
and worker power, and the role of domestic workers’ individual and collective agency in 
the process. The third chapter outlines the methodology used in designing the study, 
collecting the data, and analysing the results.  
 
The next three chapters present and analyse the results. Chapter 4 charts the evolution of 
paid domestic work in the city of Maputo from the colonial period to the present day, 
highlighting the changing forms of regulation and protection in this sector. Chapter 5 
presents initial reflections on the strengths and weaknesses of Decree 40/2008 through a 
detailed description of current working conditions among domestic workers in the 
sample. It also explores how labour protections have affected the strategies and tactics 
domestic workers use to negotiate with employers. Chapter 6 maps the formal 
institutional context for the regulation and protection of domestic work. It examines the 
ways in which formal institutions - including the labour courts, inspectorate, conciliation 
and mediation centres, legal service providers, training and placement agencies, and 
workers’ organisations - enable or constrain improvements in working conditions.  
 
While it is still too early to gauge the full impact of Decree 40/2008, Chapter 7 concludes 



















Since the 1970s, scholarly research on paid domestic work has evolved primarily in 
response to conceptual shifts in gender and development theory. The first studies in this 
sector sought to challenge modernist assumptions of development, highlighting the 
continued importance of domestic work in an industrialised economy (Boserup 1970; 
Chaplin 1973). By the 1980s feminists, particularly in Southern Africa, shifted attention 
to the ways in which domestic work reflected and reproduced overlapping forms of race, 
class, and gender oppression (Cock 1980; Gaitskell 1984; Hansen 1989; Schmidt 1992). 
These studies tended to overemphasise a domestic worker’s powerlessness in the face of 
a hegemonic employer. In the 1990s, drawing on emerging feminist discourse, scholars 
refracted this sector through a new lens, focusing on domestic workers’ individual and 
collective agency (Romero 1992; Dill 1994; Constable 1997). 
 
In the last decade, there has been a resurgence of scholarly interest in paid domestic 
work. This coincides with a period of global economic transformation marked by rising 
inequality, the feminisation and casualisation of wage labour, and deteriorating public 
services (Boris and Parreñas 2010). The proliferation of domestic work presents a 
dilemma for feminist scholars. While it facilitates women’s participation in the labour 
force - both as domestic workers and employers - it also produces and reinforces 
socioeconomic inequalities (Anderson 2000). Advocacy for the formalisation of paid 
domestic work stems from the need to resolve this dilemma (Ally 2010). Most recently, 
studies have focused on the potential role of formalisation in improving domestic 
workers’ working conditions (Beneria 2000; Ally 2010; Du Preez 2010; Chen 2011; 
Neetha 2011; Tomei 2011; Nadasen 2012). This chapter reviews the key debates 
surrounding the formalisation of domestic work, the opportunities and limitations of 
legislating rights in this intimate sector, and the potential role of domestic workers’ 
individual and collective agency. 
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2.2 Domestic Work: A Profession Like No Other or Like Any Other? 
 
Paid domestic work does not easily fit into dominant categories of informality (Chen 
2011). The tasks involved in domestic work are mostly not illegal; domestic work is 
predicated on a generally clear employment relationship; and it is usually the employer, 
not the worker, who refuses to register, make tax contributions, or comply with labour 
law. What gives domestic work an informal character is that by and large, domestic 
workers have been either explicitly or implicitly excluded from labour protections. This 
section discusses the roots of domestic workers’ historic marginalisation. 
First, domestic workers are employed in the private homes of individuals. Isolated behind 
closed doors and high walls, they are invisible to the outside world, inaccessible to labour 
inspectors and unions, and outnumbered in the household (Cock 1980; Fish 2006; Chen 
2011). Domestic workers negotiate working conditions on a one-on-one basis with 
employers. This not only makes them prone to abuse, but difficult to organise (Cobble 
2010). Live-in workers are particularly vulnerable as they rely on their employers for a 
place to live.  
 
Second, domestic work consists of intimate tasks such as raising children, washing dirty 
underwear and resolving family crises. This adds a personalness to the employment 
relationship (Hansen 1989). Despite or perhaps because of the intimate nature of 
domestic work, power relationships between employer and employee are deeply unequal. 
In her study of domestic workers in Zambia, Hansen (1990) describes how employers 
imposed high levels of rigidity, inventing rules and protocols in order to ensure that 
workers did not conflate physical intimacy with social proximity. Domestic workers’ 
hygiene was closely regulated; they were not allowed to eat the same food, from the same 
plates, at the same table as other members of the household; they were infantilised and 
subjected to arbitrary punishment, at times even physical or sexual abuse. Rigidity, 
argues Constable (1997) in her study of Filipina domestic workers in Hong Kong, is 
particularly important where an employer’s class position is close to a worker’s.  
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However, employers simultaneously cultivate a familial relationship with domestic 
workers, often switching between high levels of formality and intimacy at their own 
discretion (du Preez, Beswick et al. 2010). In her study of domestic work under apartheid 
South Africa, Cock (1980) found that the majority employers claimed that domestic 
workers were one of the family. Yet only ten per cent of them knew their employee’s full 
names. Employers manipulate the myth of one of the family to assert control, secure 
loyalty, and obscure workers’ own family needs. In addition, Qayum and Ray (2010) 
argue, based on their study of domestic workers in Kolkata, that this familial construction 
makes it easier for employers to accept strangers into their own homes.  
 
Third, domestic work is considered an extension of women’s unpaid care work. Driven 
by a gender bias that accounts only for commodified labour and undervalues sectors 
dominated by women (Elson 1995; Beneria 2000; Himmelweit 2002; Budlender 2004; 
Razavi 2007), domestic work is regarded as something other than employment, thought 
to require less skill, and therefore deserving of less pay (Hondagneu-Sotelo 2001; 
Gutierrez Rodriguez 2007). As Boris and Parreñas (2010) reflect: “when intimacy 
becomes employment…it becomes regarded as unskilled work that anyone can perform 
because women have undertaken such activities without payment” (Boris and Parreñas 
2010, 11).  
 
Some scholars challenge the emphasis on women’s work, pointing to the multiple ways 
in which men are incorporated into the global care chain (Zamparoni 2000; Manaslan 
2006; Kilkey 2010). In his study of the evolution of domestic work in colonial 
Mozambique, Zamparoni (2002) argues that domestic work is not necessarily a female 
occupation. Well into the 1980s, domestic workers were primarily men. Zamparoni 
(2000) humorously recounts how one day at the height of the Mozambican civil war, his 
domestic worker returned home after a week of army training, hung up his machine gun 
in the kitchen, changed from his camouflaged uniform into a white apron and started to 
clean. A similar phenomenon is documented in Zimbabwe and Zambia (Hansen 1986; 
Hansen 1989; Schmidt 1992).  
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However, Ray (2000) contends that within domestic work, men generally command 
higher ranks, control higher skilled positions and receive higher salaries than women. 
Studies of domestic work in colonial Southern Africa support this argument. In colonial 
Mozambique, men were generally considered more intelligent, more efficient, and more 
obedient than women and well-paid positions such as a chef or nanny were reserved for 
male workers. Meanwhile positions reserved for women, such as laundry workers, were 
the worst paid. Women’s lower remuneration was justified by the Portuguese colonial 
state on the basis that their income was supplementary to men’s. The myth of the male as 
primary wage earner undermined the wages of female workers (Rita-Ferreira 1967/1968; 
Hansen 1992; Penvenne 1994; Goenha 2002).  
 
Fourth, domestic work is highly racialised (Romero 1992). In South Africa, Cock (1980) 
illustrates how domestic work was not only as a microcosm of colonial apartheid, but 
served to replicate the deep inequalities created by a vicious system of racial domination. 
For most South Africans, the sphere of domestic work was one of the first sites of 
interracial interaction - space where White children learned and performed their white 
supremacy, and where African women, exposed to the severity of inequality, developed 
an incredible sense of deprivation.  
 
However, there is significant debate about whether the racialised nature of domestic work 
has resulted in limited rights for domestic workers or whether the need for a vulnerable, 
unprotected workforce has facilitated the racialisation of this sector. Anderson (2000) 
argues the latter. Racial differences, she suggests, make it easier for employers to create a 
narrative around one group of women as more suitable for domestic work than another. In 
their study of domestic work in Kolkata - a place where employers are frequently of the 
same ethnicity as their employees - Qayum and Ray (2010) echo this view: 
 
…To argue that the inequalities that produce and are reproduced by the institution 
of domestic servitude are attributable primarily to racial hierarchies and 
citizenship status involves…a certain misrecognition…In fact, we suggest, the 
employer-domestic servant nexus is profoundly racialised to substantiate the 
inherent relation of dominant/subordination. (Qayum and Ray, 102) 
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Fifth, the multitude of employers, heterogeneity of working conditions, and domestic 
workers’ perceived contradictory class identities, means that this sector has been 
historically ignored by organised labour (Ray 2000; Nadasen 2010; Chen 2011; Neetha 
2011; Tomei 2011). “It is these characteristics of the intimate workplace - smaller, 
dispersed, more personal and privatised - and of the intimate worker - casualised and 
lacking a classic adversarial class consciousness - that many see as impediments to 
unionism” (Cobble 2010, 284).  
 
Finally, the globalisation of care work has further marginalised migrant domestic 
workers. In her study of Filipina domestic workers in Hong Kong, Constable (1997) 
illustrates how domestic workers’ abilities to deal with work-related problems are limited 
by their tenuous status as outsiders. Parreñas (2001) terms this partial citizenship. 
Contracts binding domestic workers to an employer, the prohibition of alternative work, 
exemptions from labour and social protection, and the criminalisation of undocumented 
migrants, curtail domestic workers’ political incorporation, reinforcing their 
vulnerabilities vis-à-vis employers (Boris 1995; Parreñas 2001; Walsum 2011; Nadasen 
2012). Stasiulis and Bakan (1997) are more optimistic. They contend that citizenship is 
not static. Rather, it is negotiated and shifts over time. Even migrant workers can carve 
out new forms of citizenship.  
 
2.3 Formalising Intimacy: The Limitations of Labour Protections 
 
Formalisation can take different forms and mean different things to different categories of 
workers. Labour protections are an important facet of formalisation. Not only does they 
provide an incentive for domestic workers to comply with other forms of formalisation, 
but also ensures that they benefit from these (Chen 2011). However, studies on the 
impact of labour protections offer contradictory conclusions, illustrating perhaps the 
complexity of the issue. This section will explore the debate on the transformative 
potential of labour protections. 
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Advocates contend that formalisation through regulation, the extension of legal and social 
protections, collective bargaining, and professionalisation, facilitates improvements in 
working conditions (Hobden 2010; Chen 2011; ILO 2011; Tomei 2011; Varia 2011; 
Walsum 2011; Albin and Mantouvalou 2012). Formalisation reframes domestic work as a 
skilled job, made up of tasks that are clearly defined, as opposed to the amorphous 
descriptions that often exist in this intimate profession. It transforms the traditionally 
maternalistic employee-employer relationship into one governed by contracts, rights, and 
responsibilities. It protects domestic workers who choose to take individual or collective 
action. It provides a focus around which domestic workers can collectively organise, raise 
awareness, and exert influence in policymaking. Given that some domestic workers have 
multiple employers and that there are no employers’ associations to collectively bargain 
with, legislation provides the next best alternative to ensure basic minimum standards 
(Hobden 2010; ILO 2011; Varia 2011).  
 
A second group argue that legislation has little impact on working conditions due to the 
peculiarities of domestic work. Domestic work is not like work in any other sector. It is 
intimate work, carried out within the confines of the household, where household 
members outnumber workers, and where, hidden from public scrutiny, workers ultimately 
have to negotiate working conditions on a one-on-one basis with employers. In their 
study of the formalisation of domestic work in South Africa, Fish (2006), King (2007) 
and Du Preez (2010) suggest that limited enforcement mechanisms, institutionalised 
power relationships, and the private nature of the workplace, collectively curtail 
enforcement of labour protections. Enforcement is particularly difficult in developing 
countries where there may be progressive labour regulation but an absence of strong 
institutions and trained bureaucrats to implement these (Ronconi 2008).  
 
Chen (2011) agrees that in many countries problems of implementation and enforcement 
exclude domestic workers de facto from labour protections. However, this does not 
render formalisation irrelevant. Rather, Chen (2011) argues, strategies of formalisation 
need to be adapted to domestic work. For instance, labour protections assume a clear 
employment relationship yet neither employers nor domestic workers necessarily 
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perceive themselves in their respective roles. Formalisation is a slow, on-going process, 
and incentives need to be carefully negotiated and renegotiated with workers and 
employers. In Brazil for instance, registered domestic workers receive a pass or carteira 
assinada, entitling them to full social protections. Employers can deduct contributions 
made to workers’ social security from their income taxes. This is part of a broader state 
scheme to expand social protections to vulnerable workers in general, and improve 
domestic workers’ conditions in particular (Tomei 2011).  
 
Workers’ organisations can also play a decisive role in securing de facto rights for 
domestic workers (Ally 2010; Bonner 2010; Hobden 2010; Nadasen 2010; Chen 2011). 
In her profile of the National Domestic Workers Union of America (NDWUA) in 
Atlanta, Nadasen (2010) describes how one union, though not highly confrontational, 
transformed members’ lives by giving value to the profession and empowering workers 
to negotiate working conditions directly with employers. Though bargaining took place at 
an individual level, the collective nature of the demands, namely a minimum wage, paid 
vacation, and sick leave, gave union members a collective identity. This model, argues 
Nadasen (2010), is instructive for domestic worker organising today: 
 
Rather than placing their fate with union leaders whom they may or may not have 
voted for, NDWUA’s approach put power in the hands of individual workers who 
could decide for themselves their priorities and under what circumstances they 
would work. (Nadasen 2010, 208) 
 
A third group warns that formalisation can actually be detrimental to domestic workers. 
In his study of the formalisation of domestic work in South Africa, Hertz (2005) found 
that despite high rates of non-compliance, the establishment of a minimum wage 
triggered the casualisation of this sector, as employers cut back hours and laid workers 
off. Consequently, domestic workers are forced to work for multiple employers, 
intensifying workloads and increasing commuting times. While total monthly earnings 
have risen slightly, when accounted for inflation, the increase has been negligible. The 
negative effects of job losses as outweigh the benefits (Hertz 2005). However, Dinkelman 
and Ranchhod (2012) dispute these findings, arguing that wage increases for domestic 
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workers have not had any statistically significant effect on employment. Furthermore, 
strong sanctions are not necessary for labour regulations to have an impact. Bhorat et al. 
(2010) dispute this last point however, arguing that infractions tend to be higher in 
regions such as rural areas that have fewer enforcement resources. 
 
A second critique of formalisation, is that it may disempower domestic workers by 
replacing the traditionally maternalistic employee-employer relationship with a 
paternalistic will to empower relationship between state and subject. Ally (2010) points to 
the organisational culture of South African labour inspectors as an example. Enforcement 
officials fail to understand the full scope of domestic workers’ resistance, interpreting 
masks of deference as a sign of weakness or apathy, reflects one domestic worker: 
 
They [the Department of Labour] are not realising how much it pains when you 
say ‘yes’, but if you don’t, you will have to tell your babies ‘no.’ It pains, it does, 
but you tell yourself it’s part of the job. You must stop being too soft and let the 
feelings get to you. You have to be tough. (Ally 2010, 104) 
 
Ally (2010) argues that this will to empower has extended to workers’ organisations. 
Drawing on the case of the South African Domestic Service and Allied Workers Union 
(SADSAWU) she suggests that formalisation has transformed the union into a 
beneficiary whose primarily role is to disseminate information rather than actively 
represent workers’ collective interests. 
 
A final critique is that as bonds of patronage between employer and employee are 
replaced with contractual rights and responsibilities, workers may find that they have less 
flexibility to negotiate working conditions. Despite the deeply unequal nature of the 
relationship between employee and employer, domestic workers can leverage intimacy to 
informally secure better conditions and extract in-kind benefits (Romero 1992; Parreñas 
2001; Walsum 2011). The depersonalisation inherent in formalisation can threaten 
domestic workers’ historically cultivated practices of power (Ally 2010, 196). Intimacy is 
particularly important where labour market opportunities are limited, competition 
between workers high, and workers’ bargaining power curtailed (Tomei 2011).  
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2.4 Power, Agency and Resistance 
 
Given that domestic workers ultimately negotiate working conditions on a one-on-one 
basis with employers, the debate on the role of labour protections invariably touches on 
the transformative potential of workers’ individual agency. Studies in the 1980s tended to 
focus on domestic workers’ powerlessness in the face of hegemonic employers (Cock 
1980; Gaitskell 1984; Hansen 1989; Schmidt 1992). Cock (1980) for instance, 
characterises domestic work as a form of ultra-exploitation. While she recognises the 
subtle ways in which domestic workers try to assert control over their labour, assuming 
for instance a mask of deference in order to conform to employer expectations and shield 
their own feelings, she concludes that this cannot be identified as a form of resistance, but 
more aptly described as a mode of survival.  
 
By 1990s, inspired by the work of James C. Scott (1985), scholars began to explore the 
transformative potential of even subtle forms of resistance. Even the smallest acts of 
defiance became heroic manifestations of the transformative potential of domestic 
workers’ individual and collective agency: “They [domestic workers] were freedom 
fighters. Women who fought without guns or picket signs, but used the weapons they had 
honed for craftiness, observation, imitation and criticism” (Dill 1994, 139). In her study 
of Bedouin women however, Lila Abu-Lughod (1990) cautioned against romanticising 
the structural significance of everyday acts of resistance: 
 
The problem has been that those of us who have sensed that there is something 
admirable about resistance have tended to look to it for hopeful confirmation of 
the failure—or partial failure—of systems of oppression. Yet it seems to me that 
we respect everyday resistance not just by arguing for the dignity or heroism of 
the resistors but by letting their practices teach us about the complex inter-
workings of historically changing structures of power. (Abu-Lughod 1990, 53) 
 
By the 2000s, scholars, recognising that domestic workers’ individual agency can take 
many and at times contradictory forms, moved beyond the agency-exploitation binary to 
explore the range of ways in which domestic workers sought to improve working 
conditions (Constable 1997; Boris and Parreñas 2010). In her study of Filipina domestic 
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workers in Hong Kong, Constable (1997) illustrates how workers subject themselves to 
high levels of discipline, pressuring one another to conform to manifestations of 
professionalism. A professional domestic worker is one who is acquiescent, strives to 
understand the employer’s point of view, thinks positively, makes lists, delegates tasks, 
and is well-groomed. Creative forms of escapism enable domestic workers to sustain self-
discipline, make sense of their suffering, control negative emotions, and cultivate an 
alternate identity to that of servant. While self-discipline may limit domestic workers’ 
ability to fundamentally transform working conditions, it can improve their relationships 
with employers, provide them with a sense of control over their labour and feeling of 
personal satisfaction (Constable 1997). Self-discipline is not as a reflection of domestic 
workers’ internalised oppression. 
 
Domestic workers also manipulate the intimate employee-employer relationship in order 
to extract in-kind benefits and improve working conditions (Romero 1992; Parreñas 
2001). By talking to employers about their problems over tea for instance, workers are 
able to secure an extended vacation, a pay raise, a loan, and money for school fees or 
funeral costs (Walsum 2011). Ally (2010) argues that while the majority of South African 
domestic workers, particularly live-out full-time workers, prefer a formal employment 
relationship, they cultivate personal relationships with employers in order to manage their 
working conditions. However Chen (2011) suggests that while domestic workers may 
successfully leverage familial ties, relations remain deeply unequal (Chen 2011).  
 
Humour is an important form of resistance. Constable (1997) illustrates how domestic 
workers in Hong Kong use humour critique employers or reverse patterns of domination 
 
A Filipina domestic helper arrives in Hong Kong at the home of her new 
employer. The employer says to her, “We want to treat you as a member of the 
family.” The domestic helper is very happy to hear this. On Sunday, the helper’s 
day off, her employer says to her, “You must work before you leave the house on 
Sundays because you are a member of the family.” And the employer adds, “And 
you must come home in time to cook dinner for the family.” “But sir, ma’am, I 
would like to eat with my friends today, because it is my day off,” says the helper. 
“But you are a member of the family,” says the employer, “and because you are a 
member of the family, you must eat with us.” (Constable 1997, 104) 
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Finally, domestic workers do engage in more overt forms of resistance, both at the 
individual and collective level. At parks and taxi ranks they share grievances, exchange 
information about wages, and learn about their rights. They make collective demands 
from employers, transforming individual acts into collective action (Parreñas 2001). They 
join unions, file legal actions, and hold pickets outside the homes of bad employers 
(Constable 1997). Ultimately, it is difficult to predict what impact individual acts of 




Formalisation is a slow, on-going process towards varying degrees of formality. It is not 
made up of precisely defined steps. The case of Brazil suggests that state intervention can 
lead to sustained improvements in domestic workers’ conditions but that incentives are 
key, and need to be carefully negotiated and renegotiated with employers and employees.  
 
The terms of labour protections and the mechanisms of enforcement are of critical 
importance. Though predicated on employment relationships, domestic work is a 
profession like no other. It takes place in isolation, in the private space of the home - a 
site widely accepted as private and free from regulation - and conditions are generally 
negotiated one-on-one with employers. It is made up of intimate tasks that add a 
personalness to the employment relationship, yet employee-employer relations are deeply 
unequal. Nonetheless domestic workers do manipulate intimacy, through at times 
contradictory forms of accommodation and resistance, to secure concrete improvements 
in their working conditions. In a context where domestic workers are ultimately 
responsible for negotiating working conditions on a one-on-one basis with employers, 
labour protections need to support workers’ historically cultivated practices of power.  
 
Finally, it is important to recognise the limitations of labour protections that cannot 
address the structural issues that funnel domestic workers into this sector. Structural 
changes in the way domestic work is organised may be beyond the scope of labour 
protection. 
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CHAPTER 3 
METHODOLOGY 
3.1 Introduction  
Based on early indications of the impact of Decree 40/2008 on working conditions, this 
study discusses the opportunities and limitations of legislating worker justice in an 
intimate profession. It explores how formal institutions, specifically Decree 40/2008, the 
labour courts, the inspectorate, conciliation and mediation centres, legal service 
providers, training and placement agencies, and workers’ organisations, enable or prevent 
improvements in working conditions. It also seeks to capture the informal strategies and 
tactics domestic workers use to negotiate better conditions both at the individual and 
collective level. This chapter outlines the methodology used in designing the study, 
collecting the data and analysing the results. 
 
3.2 The Research Design  
The study uses a qualitative research design. Given the research objectives, a qualitative 
design is appropriate as it allows the researcher to piece together in-depth understanding, 
probe for further detail, elicit complex responses, and reveal critical insights into 
processes and relationships behind the formalisation of domestic work (Creswell 1998; 
Mack, Woodsong et al. 2005; Bradley, Curry et al. 2007; Denzin and Licoln 2008).  
In order to address concerns over validity and reliability, this study uses two forms of 
triangulation, namely data and methodological triangulation (Denzin and Licoln 2008). 
The data sources include historical data, census statistics, government documents, media 
clippings, primary observations, and semi-structured interviews with key informants and 
domestic workers. Ultimately, rigour is defined by the paradigm that informs the research 
design (Haverkamp and Young 2007). This study draws on a critical paradigm which 
views the researcher as a research instrument whose role is not only to generate 
knowledge but also to facilitate transformative change (Guba and Licoln 1994; 
Haverkamp and Young 2007).  
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3.3 Choice of Location 
The site for this study is Mozambique’s capital city, Maputo. With more than a million 
people excluding the suburbs, Maputo is an atypical selection within Mozambique. For 
over a century, it has been the country’s most dynamic economic node. A magnet for 
internal migrant workers, foreign settlers, and international capital, its rapid development 
during the early to mid 20th century has spurred the growth of the domestic work sector, 
and today 60 per cent of Mozambican domestic workers are clustered in and around the 
city (INE 2007)2. Maputo is more tightly connected to the state apparatus than other 
regions, and the enforcement of Decree 40/2008 is therefore likely to be stronger in this 
city.  The case study consequently allows the researcher to approach the inquiry knowing 
that, “If it is not valid for this case, then it is not valid for any (or only a few) cases” 
(Flyvbjerg 2006, 230). In other words, if formalisation has little impact on domestic 
worker’ working conditions in Maputo, it is not likely to have more of an impact in other 
parts of Mozambique. 
3.4 Sampling 
Fourteen key informants were interviewed. They were purposively selected based on 
their knowledge and experience of the formal and informal institutional context in which 
domestic workers operate. Some were selected ahead of the study’s implementation while 
others were added as a result of preliminary interviews. During the preliminary 
interviews for instance, it became clear that there were multiple organisations 
representing domestic workers and they were added to the list of key informants. This 
accommodation of changing conditions is what Morse, Barrett et al. (2002) refer to as 
investigator responsiveness; a key element of qualitative rigour. 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 According to the General Population Census of 2007 (INE 2007), nationally, there are 63 013 domestic 
workers, 90 per cent of whom live in urban areas, and 40 per cent whom live and work in Maputo City. 
This number is likely to be much larger. Furthermore, given that many domestic workers live outside the 
formal city limits in more affordable areas, the percentage of domestic workers who work in the City of 
Maputo is probably closer to 60 per cent.  
	   18	  
The final list of key informants includes: 
• Co-founder, Forum Mulher 
• Coordinator, Women in Law in Southern Africa 
• Secretary General, Associação de Empregados Domésticos de 
Moçambique (Mozambican Domestic Workers’ Association - AEDOMO) 
• Secretary General, Associação das Mulheres Empregadas Domésticas 
(Women’s Association of Domestic Workers – AMUEDO) 
• Celeste Hospitality Co-Founder 
• Mediator, Comissão de Mediação e Arbitragem Laboral (Commission for 
Labour Mediation and Arbitration - Maputo City Section) 
• Coordinator, Comité da Mulher Trabalhadora (Working Women’s 
Committee--COMUTRA) 
• Labour Inspector, Ministry of Labour - Maputo City Section 
• Labour Judge, Ministry of Labour - Maputo City Section 
• Lawyer, Associação da Mulher, Lei e Desenvolvimento (Association of 
Women, Law and Development - MULEIDE) 
• Director of Legal, Labour, and Social Affairs, Confederação Nacional dos 
Sindicatos Independentes e Livres de Moçambique (National Federation of 
Independent and Democratic Unions - CONSILMO) 
• Director of Legal, Labour, and Social Affairs, Organização dos 
Trabalhadores Moçambicanos (Mozambican Workers’ Organization - 
OTM) 
• Director of Legal, Labour and Social Affairs, OTM 
• Secretary for Internal Organising, OTM 
• Executive Secretary for Maputo City and Province, Sindicato Nacional de 
Empregados Domésticos (National Union of Domestic Workers - SINED) 
• Executive Secretary of the National Council of Youth Domestic Workers, 
SINED 
• Secretary for International Relations, SINED 
• Secretary for Organising, SINED 
• Secretary General, SINED 
 
Twelve paid domestic workers in the City of Maputo were interviewed. This study uses 
the definition of paid domestic work outlined in Decree 40/2008, which defines it as 
regular remunerated service provided to members of a household within a residence 
(Boletim da República 2008). The sample was selected purposefully, with an eye on 
including as broad a range of experiences and characteristics as possible. Six of the 
domestic workers were union members and six were non-union workers. Four had 
participated in formal mediation processes - either via the union, a workers’ association, 
and the Comissão de Mediação e Arbitragem Laboral (Commission for Mediation and 
Arbitration - COMAL), or the labour courts - and eight in informal negotiations with 
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employers. The sample was too small to stratify according to gender, age, location, and 
work activity. Nonetheless, the researcher selected domestic workers who represented a 
range of experiences along these variables. Table 1 provides a profile of the respondents. 
Child domestic workers were excluded from the sample because they are protected by a 
different set of rights and responsibilities. Despite guarantees, only SINED provided 
access to their members. 
Table 1: Profile of domestic workers interviewed 
Code Union 
member 
Gender Age Neighbourhood 
of employment 
Formal Mediation 
A No Male 20s Bairro Triunfo Yes, COMAL and court 
B Yes Female 40s Sommerschield No 
C No Female 20s Polana No 
D No Female 30s Alto Maé No 
E Yes Female 60s Museu Yes, union and COMAL 
men F No Female 40s Maxaquene No 
G Yes Female 50s Polana No 
H Yes Female 40s Museu No 
I No Female 60s Boane No 
J Yes Female 40s N/a Yes, union  
K Yes Male 60s Alto Maé Yes, union  
L No Female 30s Museu No. 
 
3.5 Research Instrument: The Semi-Structured Interview Guide 
Semi-structured interviews with key informants and paid domestic workers were central 
to this study. The advantage of a semi-structured approach is it ensures that the researcher 
is able to consistently collect information from each respondent, while also allowing for a 
degree of flexibility which may give rise to unanticipated details (Kvale 1996; Turner III 
2010). Separate interview guides were developed for domestic workers, union leaders, 
legal service providers, government officials, and domestic workers’ agencies. These 
were translated into Portuguese by the researcher (see Appendix 3.1.1-3.1.10 for both the 
English and Portuguese versions).   
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All the interviews began with an explanation of the objectives of the interview. The 
respondents were asked to sign a consent form (see Appendix 3.2) and give their 
permission to be recorded. Some key informants, government officials in particular, 
refused to be recorded. During un-taped interviews the researcher took shorthand notes 
that were promptly written up. Key-informant interviews were not pilot-tested due to the 
diversity of the actors. The interview guide for union leaders was structured into five 
sections. The first question asked how they got involved in the labour movement. This 
was not only to build rapport but also to better understand the history and context of the 
institution they represented. The second focused on the organisation; when it was 
founded, how many members it has, and its strategic programme. The third section 
examined the elaboration of Decree 40/2008. The fourth and fifth sections asked 
respondents to evaluate the regulation.  
 
The interview guide for legal service providers had a similar structure, as did the 
interview guide for government officials, though the latter also asked questions about 
training and dissemination of the regulation. In contrast, the interview guide for domestic 
workers’ agencies focused on training, placement, their role in defining working 
conditions, and past collaboration with workers’ organisations. 
 
The interview guide for domestic workers was structured into four sections. The first was 
a background section intended to build rapport, which started with the instruction, Tell me 
a little about yourself. The second section delved into the impact of the regulation while 
simultaneously collecting information about the respondents’ current working conditions. 
The third section asked domestic workers to reflect on the profession as a whole. The 
final section explored the ways in which domestic workers navigate conflict. This 
interview guide was pilot-tested. Two questions provided particularly rich information:  
Has the way you deal with conflict changed? and, What do you think would improve the 
working conditions of domestic workers? The main modification was made in the section 
on navigating conflict. Domestic workers were reluctant, or perhaps embarrassed, to use 
the word conflict, so it was replaced with challenge. Furthermore the interview guide 
initially used cards as visual aids, but these were replaced by verbal descriptors.  
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All the interviews were concluded by asking respondents whether there was anything 
they felt had not been asked. By ending in this way, the researcher placed the power back 
in the respondents’ hands. It was at this point that the researcher asked for contacts, 
permission to attend upcoming events, or copies of documents discussed in the interview.  
 
3.6 Data Collection 
Data collection took place in three phases. The first phase consisted of developing a 
sketch of the relevant institutions and gatekeepers. In April 2011, the researcher attended 
a conference organised by Fórum Mulher (Women’s Forum), a coalition of Mozambican 
women’s rights organisations, through which she was able to make initial contact with 
key gatekeepers including: the head of OTM’s Working Women’s Committee 
(COMUTRA), without whom it would have been difficult to get buy-in from the labour 
movement; a founding member of Fórum Mulher, who was instrumental in linking to 
legal service providers; and the coordinator of Women in Law in Southern Africa 
(WLSA), who provided helpful background information on Mozambique’s legal 
structure. Historical and census research was also critical to this first phase. Given that 
the research questions are implicitly impact questions, it was important to understand the 
historical, political, social, and economic context for the regulation and protection of 
domestic workers.  
The second phase of the research consisted of observations at numerous sites - including 
a park, a taxi rank, the Comissão de Mediação e Arbitragem Laboral (Commission for 
Labour Mediation and Arbitration - COMAL), the Labour Section of the Justice Palace, 
union offices- and actions, such as International Domestic Workers’ Day celebration. The 
second phase also included 14 semi-structured interviews with key informants, conducted 
by the researcher in Portuguese and transcribed into English. Prior to initiating this phase, 
the researcher submitted formal interview requests to each institution (see Appendix 3.3). 
Interviews with the leadership of the Organização dos Trabalhadores Moçambicanos 
(Organisation of Mozambican Workers - OTM) were particularly difficult to secure due 
to their busy schedules and overall scepticism. The domestic workers’ organisations were 
more collaborative. The National Union of Domestic Workers (SINED) in particular, 
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were eager to share information, network nationally and internationally, access external 
sources for funding, give multiple candid interviews, and make their members available 
for interviews. Interviews with government officials were secured informally; a reflection 
of the resilience of patronage systems in the public sector and the absence of a 
mechanism to process research requests. Three institutions, namely the public legal 
services Institute for Legal Aid and Advocacy (IPAJ), the Police of the Republic of 
Mozambique, and the domestic workers’ agency, Mãos e Artes, did not respond to 
interview requests. The respondents were not remunerated for their participation.  
The third phase of the study consisted of 12 semi-structured interviews with adult 
domestic workers in the city of Maputo. Interviews took place at a range of locations 
including the union headquarters, taxi ranks, parks, and in one instance, an employer’s 
apartment building. With the exception of one, all the interviews were conducted in 
Portuguese. One interview was conducted in Portuguese and Shangana, with the help of 
an interpreter. The respondents were not remunerated for their participation. However 
they were provided with a copy of a know your rights booklet, with a simplified version 
of Decree 40/2008 for domestic workers published by Fórum Mulher. Interviews with 
domestic workers lasted on average for 30 minutes. Given their demanding schedules and 
long commutes, many domestic workers preferred to meet during work hours. However, 
this created certain pitfalls. Half way through one interview with a domestic worker, her 
employer came home, snatched the consent form from the respondent’s hands, and read 
it. The domestic worker pretended to be sceptical about participating until her employer 
ordered her to participate. 
3.7 Data Analysis 
The researcher undertook the translation and transcription of the interviews during 
fieldwork. This allowed her to identify initial themes, contradictions, and affirmations, 
and make necessary adjustments to the interview guide. For instance, a question on 
minimum wage was added. After the completion of the fieldwork, the transcripts, 
observations, and notes were imported into N-Vivo, a computerised data management 
programme. Themes or parent nodes were derived from the theoretical framework and 
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research questions. Each of the parent nodes had child- and grandchild nodes. As new 
themes emerged, new codes were identified. Codes were then merged, divided, and 
shifted. This on-going process of analysis was necessary in order to refine each theme.  
One of the key challenges of the data analysis was gauging the veracity of statements. In 
some instances, it was clear that both key informants and domestic workers were either 
not entirely forthcoming or untruthful. One union leader delivered the majority of the 
interview by reading the organisation’s manual. Other instances were unclear. When 
asked what she liked least about her job, one domestic worker hesitated then said, 
“There’s one thing I don’t like, but I do it…I don’t know if there’s anything I don’t like. 
Everything needs to be done.” Only after the researcher reassured her that the interview 
was confidential, did she respond. This highlights the need to triangulate information 
with other sources.  
3.8 Limitations and Questions for Further Research 
As the first of its kind in Mozambique, the results of this study have broken new ground. 
Nonetheless, there are a number of limitations. First, a decision was made to focus only 
on domestic workers in the cement city because they are the most likely to be involved in 
processes of formalisation. Limiting the sample area to the city reduces the heterogeneity 
of the sample. Stereotypes suggest that the class and cultural differences between workers 
and employers in the outskirts are not as marked. A domestic worker in the suburbs is 
likely to earn less and work longer hours than a worker in the cement city, share the same 
food from the same dishes as the employer, use the same cleaning supplies that they 
would use at home, speak the same language, and live in the same household.  
 
Second, the majority of domestic workers interviewed have not been through a formal 
mediation process. Because of time and resource constraints, the researcher was unable to 
develop a relationship with state officials strong enough to access former mediation and 
arbitration participants. Future research would benefit from a partnership with the 
Ministry of Labour, who could facilitate access to state institutions, contacts, and internal 
information.  
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Third, this study did not interview employers. During the observation of court hearings 
and mediations, the researcher did however have a chance to listen to employers and their 
grievances. Given that employers play an important role in the formalisation of domestic 
work, further research will benefit from interviews with employers.  
 
Fourth, given the increasingly prominent role that international networks play in domestic 
worker organising, it would have also been helpful to speak with the Maputo desk of 
International Labour Organisation. It may also have been useful to speak to international 
donors who have been funding domestic worker advocacy. 
 
Finally, the researcher is a white, middle-class Mozambican. Many domestic workers saw 
her as a potential employer and feared speaking honestly about their problems, lest she 
conclude that they are conflictual workers.  This was particularly true of interviews with 
non-union workers. In one case, a respondent asked whether the researcher could hire 
her. This power differential was exacerbated by the fact that the researcher cannot speak 
Shangana fluently. Though most domestic workers speak Portuguese, by asking domestic 
workers to speak her language, the researcher reinforced the power relationship. 
Nonetheless, this study provides a good foundation for future research. The next three 
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CHAPTER 4 
FROM BOYS TO WORKERS:  
THE EVOLUTION OF PAID DOMESTIC WORK IN MAPUTO 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter charts the evolution of paid domestic work in Maputo from the colonial 
period to the present day. Drawing on secondary data, archival research, and semi-
structured interviews, it outlines the changing forms of regulation and protection for 
domestic workers and provides a historical context for exploring the impact of Decree 
40/2008 on working conditions in Maputo. 
4.2 A Boy’s World: Domestic Work in Colonial Lourenço Marques3 
 
               “ Put the child to bed and quiet it. You can 
      love him in your heart but, don’t embrace him.” 
 
Henri-Alexandre Junod,  
Swiss missionary and ethnographer (1896) 
 
Henri Junod’s conversational guide to Ronga could not have been published at a more 
appropriate time. Translated into English, French, and Portuguese, it is a reflection of the 
emerging needs of a growing European settler class in Lourenço Marques at the turn of 
the 20th century. When Junod sent his manuscript to print, Portugal, embattled from its 
defeat in Brazil and searching for economic opportunities elsewhere, was involved in a 
war with the Gaza Empire - which it eventually won in 1897. Consolidating control over 
Southern Mozambique not only gave this fledgling colonial power command over the 
strategic bay of Lourenço Marques, but also direct access to the lucrative migrant labour 
networks established between the Gaza Empire and the Witwatersrand Native Labour 
Association (WNLA) (Rita-Ferreira 1967/1968; Penvenne 1994; Newitt 1995). 
 
Labour repression was an important component of the Portuguese colonial project 
(Hanlon 1991; Pitcher 2002; Webster, Wood et al. 2006). The 1899 Labour Law was the 
first legislation to formally differentiate between white settlers, considered citizens, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 Lourenço Marques is the colonial name for the city of Maputo. 
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indigenous Africans, and considered subjects (Mamdani 1996). Under this law, all 
indigenous men, and later women, between the ages of 14 and 60 had a moral obligation 
to work as wage-labourers for a period of three to six months a year. Only those who 
could prove that they owned capital, produced goods for export, or were already 
wageworkers, were exempt from Chibalo (forced labour) (Munslow 1984; Newitt 1995; 
O'Laughlin 2000).  
 
Chibalo was primarily a response to labour shortages triggered by migration to the South 
African gold and diamond mines where wages were higher and paid regularly. Chibalo 
also protected white workers by upholding a dual wage system (Penvenne and Manghezi 
1981). Despite high rates of desertion, Chibalo did accelerate proletarianisation to South 
Africa. In 1912, at least 91,000 Mozambicans were leased to WNLA but only 5926 were 
employed in Lourenço Marques (Penvenne and Manghezi 1981-1982). As Newitt (1995) 
reflects, the Portuguese colonial state struggled with the same problem that an 
independent Mozambique would later face: 
 
How does a relatively poor and underdeveloped country develop itself when the 
marketplace for labour, consumer goods and capital is dominated by a much 
bigger and relatively more developed neighbouring economy. (Newitt 1995, 472) 
 
Not all migrant workers made it to the South African mines. Those deemed too young, 
unskilled, or unfit by WNLA bided their time in Lourenço Marques. By 1933, one third 
of the city’s labour force was domestic workers (Penvenne 1994). For a young man from 
the rural areas, domestic work was a sort of internship in urban living; an opportunity to 
learn some Portuguese and network with potential employers; a stepping-stone to a 
better-skilled position in the mines or port. The lowest paid position was the live-in 
general worker; a houseboy usually between the ages of 8 and 15. If a domestic worker 
landed a highly paid position such as a nanny or chef, not only could he earn more than 
most African workers, but could also remain fairly independent (Rita-Ferreira 1967/1968; 
Penvenne and Manghezi 1981; Sheldon 2003). The evolution of paid domestic work as a 
primarily male profession in Lourenço Marques is grounded in this peculiar history of 
class formation (Munslow 1984). 
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Initially the colonial regime limited proletarianisation to men, relying on women in the 
rural areas to care for the young, old, sick, and unemployed (O'Laughlin 2000); cultivate 
cash crops for export; and grow food to sustain the underpaid labour force in the city 
(Africa Today 1958; Rita-Ferreira 1967/1968). As conditions in rural areas deteriorated 
however, women began to migrate to Lourenço Marques in larger numbers. As the 
demand for male labour in the emerging industrial sectors grew, the colonial state revised 
its position on women’s participation in domestic work, recasting it as an introduction to 
Western domesticity (Penvenne 1994).  
 
Nonetheless, men continued to dominate paid domestic work until the 1980s (Zamparoni 
2000). Fearing that that their husbands would enter into sexual relations with female 
domestic workers, European madams preferred to hire men. Conversely, African men on 
the other hand, were unwilling to submit African women to the risk of sexual assault. The 
perception that men were better skilled, more intelligent, and more obedient further 
contributed to the slow rate of feminisation (Penvenne 1994; Zamparoni 2000; 
Chipenembe 2010). The only sector dominated by women was laundry work; performed 
outside the employers´ home for comparatively lower pay.  
 
Fig 1 Colonial representations of domestic work  
 
Source: Painted by Manuel Santana (1936) 
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Under the colonial regime, domestic workers were highly regulated (Penvenne 1993). In 
1904, shortly after the creation of the Office of Native Affairs and Emigration, the 
Portuguese government passed the Regulamento de Serviçais e Trabalhadores Indígenas 
(Regulation on Indigenous Service Workers), forcing domestic workers to purchase a 
chapa or registration proving that they worked for only one employer (Penvenne 1994). 
In 1914, the colonial state implemented a system of identification cards, and in 1918 
forbade black Mozambicans from living in Lourenço Marques without one (O’Laughlin 
2000). The identification card was replaced by a caderneta or passbook in 1926, which 
detailed a worker’s history and tax obligations. As in South Africa, the passbook gave 
employers unique bargaining power over workers (Ally 2010).  
 
With the rise of the fascist Salazar regime in 1930, regulation became increasingly 
centralised, and unions and political organisations for black workers outlawed (Grest 
1995). In 1944, the Regulamento de Serviçais e Trabalhadores Indígenas (Regulation on 
Indigenous Service Workers) was replaced by a more comprehensive urban registration 
system designed to further limit the mobility and wages of black workers. Pay increases 
had to be approved by the local administration; unemployment became a criminal 
offence; and migrants had to register with the Municipal Labour Administration within 
three days of arriving in the city, and secure a job within two weeks (Penvenne 1993). 
Penalties for failure to register employment changes included corporal punishment, 
Chibalo and deportation to São Tome e Principe (Africa Today 1958).  
 
Domestic workers were particularly vulnerable to corporal punishment (Zamparoni 
2000). The smallest infraction, from breaking a teacup or burning a sheet while ironing to 
accusations such as disobedience, elicited a trip to the local administrator for a beating 
with a palmatória or wooden bat (Penvenne 1993). Between 1953 and 1957, 1000 
domestic workers were subjected to corporal punishment in Lourenço Marques. Seventy-
two per cent were young workers between the ages of 14 and 20 years. Francisco, a 
domestic worker for more than half a century, remembers: 
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During the colonial times, it wasn’t like today. Things have gotten better. In the 
times we worked as though we were slaves. We didn’t have time off, we had to 
work long hours, and we were beaten. (Interview with Francisco, 16 July 2011)4 
 
With the launch of the armed struggle for liberation by the Frente de Libertação de 
Moçambique (Mozambican Liberation Front or Frelimo), Chibalo was abolished and a 
new Regulamento dos Empregados Domésticos (Regulation on Domestic Workers) 
passed in 1966. Framed in terms of mutual rights and responsibilities for employers and 
employees, it legislated the right to a minimum wage, paid maternity leave, paid sick 
days, and holidays for domestic workers. In return, domestic workers were expected to be 
respectful, loyal and obedient; protect the people and goods in the home from vandalism, 
harm or theft; carry a passbook; and register all contracts at the local administrative post.  
 






Source: Boletim Oficial de Moçambique (1966) 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 In order to protect their identities, domestic workers have been given pseudonyms. 
5 Translation: Work pass of (a)…, child of … and …, born on… of…of 19.. (b) Marital status, (c) from … 
administrative post…council or municipality of …district of… resident in… sanitary book no, issues on /  
/19 by, and of id book no   / issued on   /    /19 by, in, of …of 19. (a) Full name, (b) moth and year, (c) if 
married, spouse’s name, (d) ITPAS official, (e) official’s authenticated signature with stamp, (f) official’s 
rank. 
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Penvenne (1994) suggests that in this later colonial period, the municipality did enforce 
labour protections, inspect homes, and fine deviant employers. However, domestic 
workers continued to work long hours under high levels of scrutiny and abuse. The 
Secretary General of the Associação das Mulheres Empregadas Domésticas (Women’s 
Association of Domestic Workers-AMUEDO) recalls the experience: 
 
I had to eat their leftover food from an aluminium plate. I had to drink tea from a jam 
tin, on the water tank where I washed clothes. I slept in the kitchen. I had nowhere to 
put my clothes. When it rained my clothes got wet.  They treated me as though I was 
a remote control who would provide anything at the push of a button. It was 
inhumane. (Interview with AMUEDO General Secretary, 1 July 2011) 
 
As the liberation war intensified, home inspections increasingly became a way to root out 
covert Frelimo activity. The next section will explore the transformation in the regulation 
and protection of paid domestic work following independence. 
 
4.3 From House Boys to Aunties:  
The Feminisation of Domestic Work in post-Colonial Maputo 
Não vamos esquecer o tempo que passou, 
Quem pode esquecer o que passou. 
O pai de 5 filhos chamado um rapaz, 
A mãe de 5 filhos chamado rapariga, 
Fascista de 15 anos chamado um senhor, 
Quem pode esquecer o que passou.6 
                                                                                              Popular Revolutionary Mozambican Song 
 
In 1975, Mozambique won its independence. Never again, Frelimo promised, would the 
father or mother of five children be called a boy or girl. Driven by a socialist vision, and 
out of economic and political necessity, Frelimo embarked on a modernist project of 
radical social, economic, and political transformation (Castel-Branco 1994). Chief among 
these were the nationalisation of all private property, including the majority of small and 
large enterprises; the establishment of day care centres and social halls in all state-run 
institutions; the development of mechanisms for popular participation; and the 
legalisation of unions (Cochran and Scott 1992; Grest 1995; Sheldon 2003).  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 Translation: We shall not forget what passed, who can forget the past. A father of 5 children called a boy, 
a mother of 5 children called a girl, a 15-year-old fascist called a man, who can forget what passed.  
   
For domestic workers, the transition to independence was a period of flux as the majority 
of the 250 000 Portuguese settlers, many of whom had been employers, fled or were 
deported. Almost overnight, the main source of class polarisation upon which domestic 
work was built, disappeared (Cochran and Scott 1992) . In Maputo alone, the number of 
domestic workers declined by almost 30 per cent between 1970 and 1983, despite rising 
unemployment and an influx of refugees fleeing the war. Nonetheless, the trend towards 
feminisation continued as new opportunities for male workers emerged, and the 
preferences of a new class of Mozambican employers shifted. According to Chipenembe 
(2010) 73 per cent of employers pr efer a female domestic worker. Today, women are 
considered more capable of taking care of children, more obedient and less of a risk. 
Fig 3 Trends in Paid Domestic Work, 1940-2007
Source: General Census of the Population (INE 2007); Penvenne (1994).
Frelimo’s rise to power bode well for improvements in domestic workers’ conditions. 
With the stated intent on creating a workers’ state, Frelimo began to organise workers 
through Grupos Dinamizadores (Dynamising Groups - GDs) and producti on councils 
(Marshall 1990; Cochran and Scott 1992; Grest 1995; Mamdani 1996; Pitcher 2007) .
Away from the factory floor however, domestic workers were never incorporated into 
emerging workers’ structures. In contrast to South Africa where the extension of labour
protections to domestic workers was seen as key to redressing the injustices of the past 
and engendering democracy (Ally 2010) , in Mozambique this was outside Frelimo’s 
political imagination. A number of factors contributed to the state’s failure t o extend 
protections to domestic workers. 
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First, with independence, Frelimo was confronted with a deteriorating economic 
situation, as settlers fled en masse, in many cases leaving behind sabotaged 
infrastructures (Grest 1995; Webster, Wood et al. 2006; Pitcher 2007). The establishment 
of the Resistência Nacional de Moçambique (Mozambican National Resistance--
Renamo) by the Rhodesian government, and subsequent support from the South African 
apartheid state, further exacerbated economic and political chaos (Webster, Wood et al. 
2006). It is therefore understandable that Frelimo was primarily concerned with 
developing the public sector, heavy industry, and large-scale agriculture (Pitcher 2002). 
Second, the Frelimo leadership saw domestic work as the remnant of a colonial system. 
To legitimise the profession was to perpetuate colonial relations. Furthermore, Frelimo 
distrusted domestic workers as a class. In his speeches President Samora Machel 
frequently used the symbol of the servant as a metaphor for Mozambicans’ acquiescence 
to colonialism (Machel 1974). 
Third, while Frelimo was committed to the emancipation of women, emancipation was 
conceived within a very narrow framework. Frelimo argued that through decades of 
oppression, women had internalised a sense of inferiority and only by becoming 
integrated in the formal sector, could they overcome this (Arthur 2004a). Under this 
ideological framework, domestic work merely replicated gender oppression. 
Fourth, there was not an influential, autonomous, gender machinery in Mozambique. In 
South Africa, feminists were able to successfully influence policy debates in the 
transition period, and promote a feminist agenda that broadened the definition of 
productive labour to include domestic work (Seidman, 1990). In Mozambique, the 
Organização da Mulher Moçambicana (Organisation of Mozambican Women - OMM) 
was not autonomous from the state. Rather it was founded by Frelimo to mobilise and 
engage women in the revolutionary process (Newitt 1995). OMM shared Frelimo’s 
disdain for feminism as a bourgeois, divide-and-conquer strategy (Arthur 2004a), and 
emphasised the importance of women’s participation in productive activities (Cochran 
and Scott 1992), without challenging the definition of productivity.  
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Finally, with the consolidation of production councils into the Organização dos 
Trabalhadores Moçambicanos (Organisation of Mozambican Workers - OTM), 
autonomous labour movements were centralised into an arm of the vanguard state 
(Cochran and Scott 1992). Noticeably domestic workers were excluded from the 
federation. On one hand, OTM was reluctant to organise domestic workers because of the 
dispersed nature of the workplace.  AMUEDO Secretary General explains: 
When we had regional seminars, the issue always came up. “It would have been 
easier if it were three or four companies,” they said. “But imagine organising 
domestic workers flat-by-flat in all these buildings in Maputo.” (Interview with 
AMUEDO General Secretary, 1 July 2011)  
 
However, it is also important to note that with little autonomy from Frelimo leadership, 
OTM functioned as a transmission belt for Frelimo’s decisions (Webster, Wood et al. 
2006). Even if it had been more visionary, there was little space to organise around an 
alternative agenda to Frelimo priorities (Marshall 1990; Cochran and Scott 1992). 
In the absence of a structure that regulated and protected domestic workers, conflicts 
between employers and employees were most frequently arbitrated at the police station 
where the employer had the monopoly on power (Interview with Labour Inspector 
Maputo Division, 1 February 2012). When legal cases were lodged against employers, 
these were arbitrated according to the colonial Regulamento do Trabalho Doméstico 
(1966). It was in this context of deregulation that domestic work once again thrived. 
Between 1983 and 1997, the number of domestic workers increased by more that 25 per 
cent (INE 2007). During the same period domestic workers shifted from houseboys to 
aunties, as women came to dominate this sector (Zamparoni 2000). By 2007 there were 
more than 39,000 registered domestic workers living in and around the city of Maputo; a 
50 per cent increase in just 10 years. Over 85 per cent of domestic workers are women 
and the vast majority, 75 per cent, have Grade 5 or less (INE 2007). Bound up in 
Mozambique’s history of colonisation and forced labour, paid domestic work has become 
the most important occupation for women after self-employment. The next section will 
explore the social and political context for the re-regulation of domestic work through 
Decree 40/2008 
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4.4 From Aunties to Workers: 
Re-regulating Domestic Work in the post-Washington Consensus 
In 2008, Mozambique’s National Assembly extended labour protections to domestic 
workers through Decree 40/2008. It is no coincidence that two decades after the 
Mozambican state first embarked on a project of liberalisation, deregulation, and 
privatisation, domestic workers were recast as engines of economic growth, capable of 
boosting employment in the context of massive unemployment. As part of a broader tax 
overhaul, the Mozambican state sought to incentivise the formalisation of informal 
sectors such as domestic work through the extension of labour and social protections 
(Byiers 2007). The growth of casual employment, coupled with a crumbling public care 
system as public sector crèches closed down with privatisation, further incentivised the 
Mozambican state to formalise domestic work. Ally (2010) describes a similar process in 
South Africa: “… the state presented the ‘privatisation’ of care through the market 
provision of domestic workers as the resolution to the continued labour market 
participation of both employers and employees” (Ally 2010, 131). 
 
Pressure from organised labour created a further impetus for the passage of Decree 
40/2008. Though OTM had initially overlooked domestic work, by 2004 it began to 
explore the possibility of organising informal sector workers in alliance with the 
Associação dos Operadores e Trabalhadores do Sector Informal (Association of 
Operators and Workers in the Informal Sector--ASSOTSI) (Webster, Wood et al. 2006; 
Dibben 2010). OTM was hit hard by Mozambique’s economic restructuring. Between the 
1980s and 2003, membership dropped from 300 000 to 90 000 members. The 1990 
constitutional reforms that democratised the labour movement and delinked OTM from 
the state further weakened the federation. At the precise moment when OTM faced rising 
pressure from its membership to take action against the repressive activities of newly 
privatised companies, it found itself without the capacity or means to respond. This 
seriously compromised OTM’s position among its membership, sowing the seeds for a 
divided labour movement (Arthur 2004a). In 1992, three unions split to form what is 
known today as the Conselho Nacional dos Sindicatos Livres e Independentes (National 
Federation of Free and Independent Unions - CONSILMO) (Webster, Wood et al. 2006). 
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During the declining membership, the informal sector became a strategic growth area for 
OTM (Arthur 2004b), with the potential to mobilise significant members, resources, and 
political power. The Coordinator of OTM’s Comité da Mulher Trabalhadora (Working 
Women’s Committee – COMUTRA) explains: 
 
In Mozambique the unions have had a strong interest in the informal sector for a 
while. When the factories closed many former OTM members had no recourse but 
to turn to the informal sector. OTM recognised this and pushed for the 
formalisation of these sectors. OTM was already fielding calls for help from 
domestic workers. The inclusion of domestic workers in the labour law was 
OTMs idea. (Interview with COMUTRA Coordinator, 23 June 2012) 
 
Foreign donors and international unions further encouraged organised labour’s 
reorientation towards the informal sector generally, and domestic work specifically. 
According to the Coordinator of COMUTRA, the International Labour Organisation 
(ILO) and the South African Domestic Service and Allied Workers Union (SADSAWU) 
were key motivators. The Norwegian Embassy and Italian Cooperation also provided 
support as part of their women empowerment strategy (Klaveren, Tijdens et al. 2009).  
 
A final reason for the shift in OTM’s position is that leaders from its own ranks began to 
organise domestic workers (Interview with COMUTRA Coordinator 23 June 2012). After 
a former COMUTRA representative clandestinely registered an AMUEDO and affiliated 
with the rival federation CONSILMO in 2006, OTM formed its own association, the 
Associação de Empregados Domésticos de Moçambique (Mozambican Domestic 
Workers’ Association - AEDOMO). Unbeknownst to them, a third union, and the 
Sindicato Nacional de Empregados Domésticos (National Union of Domestic Workers - 
SINED) registered in 2008. Because of the changes in the labour law in 1991, unions can 
now register without affiliating with a federation, though SINED eventually did affiliate 
with OTM. All three organisations are Maputo-based. More recently, the Beira-based 
Sindicato Nacional dos Guardas e Empregados Domésticos (National Union of Guards 
and Domestic Workers - SINGED) also affiliated with OTM. Fig 4 illustrates an 
institutional map of domestic workers’ organisations. 
 
  	   
Fig 4 Institutional map of domestic workers’ organisations 
Source: compiled by author, based on interviews with key informants.
By 2007, OTM had joined AMUEDO, and lawyers at the Ministério do Trabalho
(Ministry of Labour - MITRAB) in drafting Decree 40/2008  (Imensis 2007; Sixpence 
2007). According to the coordinator of the project, Decree 40/2008 was inspired by the 
1966 colonial regulation on domestic work (CanalMoz 2007) . Domestic workers were 
minimally included in the elaboration of the decree. The Minist ry of Labour held three 
roundtables with stakeholders. It was a process of compromise, recalls AMUEDO 
General Secretary:
I would tell the domestic workers, ‘we don’t need to rectify everything right now. 
We need to keep this legislation moving. The areas we feel we need to improve, 
we can improve in 5 years. (Interview with AMUEDO General Secretary , 1 July 
2011)
One of the most contentious debates was around whether to establish a minimum wage 
for domestic workers. Ultimately it was decided to leave salary negotiations up to the 
employer and employee. According to the Ministry of Labour’s lawyer, the absence of a 
minimum wage protects both employer and employee:
…A minimum wage would put workers at risk, because some employers also 
receive a minimum wage. On the other hand, domestic workers are also in need of 
payment, regardless of how small that amount is. (Sixpence 2007)
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Interestingly OTM did not include its affiliate AEDOMO in the drafting of the regulation. 
The General Secretary of AEDOMO explains: 
 
After the elaboration of the regulation we received a document from the Ministry 
asking for feedback. We brought together the executive committee of the 
association. The Ministry gave us very little time to provide feedback, which 
meant that we were not able to consult with our membership. We had help from a 
law student. After that I was invited by the national OTM to participate in their 
meetings that were also analysing the law. I remember that we had a lot of 
discussion. There were a number of points where our colleagues had to be 
reminded that they were fighting in the interests of domestic workers. I had to tell 
them “don’t forget that there is a domestic worker here among you.” (Interview 
with AEDOMO Secretary General, 09 July 2011) 
 
In November 2008, labour protections were finally extended to domestic workers. 
Domestic workers now have the right to a written contract, set schedule, daily break, 
weekly and annual leave, and social protection.  
 
4.5 Conclusion  
This chapter traces the evolution of paid domestic work from the colonial period to the 
present day. It illustrates that formalisation is not a unidirectional process. As the 
Mozambican state shifted from a fascist colonial to a Marxist-Leninist and then 
neoliberal state, so did the labour regimes in which domestic workers operated. Second, 
this chapter demonstrates the qualitative difference between regulation and protection. 
During the colonial period, domestic work was highly regulated yet workers were poorly 
protected. Third, this chapter shows that institutional interests are not static; they shift 
according to changing social, political, and economic circumstances. Finally, this chapter 
exposes the dynamic and highly contested nature of the gender division of labour 
(Beneria and Sen 1981; Harding 1987). Three decades after independence, Mozambican 
domestic workers are now covered by labour protections. Yet there is significant debate 
about the role of legislation in such an intimate sector. Based on early indications of the 
impact of Decree 40/2008, Chapter 5 and Chapter 6 explore the opportunities and 
limitations of labour protection in improving domestic workers’ conditions.  
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CHAPTER 5: 
WORKING IN THE “PATIENCE INDUSTRY”:  
A PROFILE OF PAID DOMESTIC WORK IN MAPUTO   
“You just have to be patient.  
That’s why we call domestic work the patience industry.” 
 
- Interview with Fernanda (8 November 2011) 
5.1 Introduction 
 
Nicknamed the patience industry, domestic work has become a hallmark of modern urban 
living. Along Maputo’s streets one can easily spot workers taking children to school, 
doing the household shopping, or running errands for employers. Posters advertising 
domestic workers’ placement agencies line the walls of apartment buildings. Street 
traders hawk batas or uniforms at intersections. In 2008 Mozambique’s National 
Assembly passed Decree 40/2008, extending labour protections to domestic workers 
(Boletim da República 2008). Drawing from semi-structured interviews and observations 
with domestic workers in the cement city, Chapter 5 provides a detailed overview of 
domestic work in Maputo. It compares current working conditions to the rights and 
responsibilities outlined in Decree 40/2008, and explores the informal strategies and 
tactics domestic workers use to negotiate concrete improvements. 
 
5.2 Work Schedule 
According to Decree 40/2008, domestic workers’ daily schedules must not exceed nine 
hours a day or 54 hours per week (Boletim da República 2008). Neighbouring countries 
stipulate a shorter workweek. In South Africa, domestic workers cannot work more than 
45 hours a week or 12 hours a day, including overtime (ILO 2012). The average workday 
in the sample is 10 hours; above the legal maximum but far below the average found in 
Chipenembe’s (2010) study. According to Chipenembe (2010), live-out domestic workers 
work on average 12 hours, while live-in workers work between 14 and 16 hours. 
Similarly, wages in this study were higher than those cited by Chipenembe (2010), 
suggesting that respondents’ working conditions may be above average for Maputo.  
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Despite above-average conditions, long workdays were the primary grievance identified 
by respondents. Live-in workers in particular are vulnerable. Filomena started working as 
a domestic worker in her teens, after her father passed away. Domestic work not only 
enables her to earn a steady income, but also gives her access to housing. She currently 
lives and works in a two bedroom, brick and zinc structure, constructed in the parking lot 
of an apartment building located in Maputo’s working class neighbourhood of Alto Maé. 
Her employer is a single mother who works during the day. Filomena has little time to 
herself:  
You can never rest... If it’s a house with babies like this one, I have to be there at 
6:30am…We agree that I’ll knock off at 16:30…but I never finish my work. The 
only time when I rest is when I lay my head on the pillow…They are constantly 
asking you to do things at whatever hour of the day or night. “I want coffee, I 
want I don’t know what. The baby is crying”…It wasn’t the agreement but since 
we’re right there, there’s no way to escape. (Interview with Filomena, 13 June 
2012) 
For many live-out workers, long commutes add to the rigorous schedule. Teresa, who is 
in her mid-60s, has been a domestic worker for 13 years. Three years ago her employer 
retired to a mashamba (small farm) outside of Maputo. Exhausted, Teresa finds the 
rigorous workday, intensity of work, and long commute from Maputo to the mashamba 
unbearable. However, with limited alternatives, she continues to work, effectively, as a 
farm worker: 
I leave my house at 3:00am…I get there at 5:30am, I sweep her yard. I’m not a 
guard ... Nonetheless I’m there sweeping her yard…These tasks we had not 
agreed on… I get home at around 9:00 or 10:00pm… I barely have time to sleep. 
Instead of giving me Saturday off to compensate for the longer travel time, she 
makes me work Saturdays as well… As I walk early in the morning to the taxi 
rank I pray, I ask, “God, please find me an alternative job, maybe not outside of 
domestic work, but at least closer to home.” (Interview with Teresa, 16 June 
2012) 
Urban sprawl, increased congestion and an inadequate public transport system have 
transformed the daily commute into a costly struggle. Like most domestic workers, Josina 
is expected to arrive before her employer leaves for work. Fearful of arriving late, she 
catches a minibus in the opposite direction, and then double-backs towards the city. She 
ends up paying double but if she waited for a direct route she would never manage to 
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secure a seat; women have lost their lives fighting to get into the packed minibuses. 
Employers, she reflects turn a blind eye to the transportation crisis: 
 
Back when there wasn’t a lot of traffic in the city, I was always punctual… But 
now, arriving on time is difficult and there is a lot of tension [with employers] 
around schedules. They [employers] pretend that they don’t know that there’s a 
transportation problem in Maputo, but they know. It’s constantly on TV. Maybe 
it’s also because they don’t watch the Mozambican news stations. They prefer to 
watch cable that doesn’t touch on the reality of our country. (Interview with 
Josina, 16 June 2012) 
 
Long workdays take a toll on domestic workers’ personal lives. Fernanda is a single 
mother of three. She returned to domestic work when her husband left her. For Fernanda, 
the schedule is more family-friendly than for instance, restaurant work. Fernanda takes 
pride in her job; she takes pleasure from learning how to do things in a different way, a 
middle-class way, and enjoys earning her own salary. However, as her children grow 
older, she worries that she cannot provide closer supervision:  
 
At what time do you get home? And you still have to do housework. That’s when 
your own children start to deviate. Because they say mum doesn’t live at home, 
she lives on the street, she just sleeps at home, so you can do whatever you 
want…Because I’m working long hours, I’m not able to take care of my own 
family. And we have families. We have children to look after. (Interview with 
Fernanda, 8 November 2011) 
 
5.3 Remuneration 
Salaries in the sample ranged between Mts 20007 and Mts 7500 a month; again, far above 
Chipenembe’s (2010) range of Mts 500 to Mts 4500. Nevertheless, the majority of 
respondents identified low salaries as a major drawback. Among the respondents, only 
Maria negotiates her salary.  Desperate for a job, domestic workers prefer to wait until 
they have built some level of rapport with employers before asking for an increase. If 
employers refuse, they negotiate with their feet. Filomena explains her strategy: 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 Mts: abbreviation for Metical, the Mozambican currency.  ZAR 1 is approximately Mts 4. 
	   41	  
Because I need that job and the shelter … I prefer to accept even a wage as low as 
Mts 1000 if that means I can have a job. However, I will continue to look for 
work…I prefer to do that than to have a long drawn out confrontation…I will 
quickly jump to someone who pays more. (Interview with Filomena, 13 June 
2012) 
 
Josina counsels against simply moving from one employer to another. There is no 
guarantee that the next employer will be better than the last. Instead she recommends 
cultivating a strong relationship with an employer through open communication. This 
takes time and requires patience: 
 
Pick a day when you see that your employer is calm and explain your problem… 
if he tries to justify his actions, to elevate himself, you need to bow down to him 
because he can’t accept that you’re equals. You need to be patient. You’ll have 
your time to talk to him, but you shouldn’t get into a heated discussion. If I can’t 
work, I’ll ask to go home…I’ll explain to him that if I stay, I may destroy dishes, 
the things around me. (Interview with Josina, 16 June 2012) 
 
While Fernanda agrees that communication with employers is important, she argues that 
many times employers do not fulfil the promises they make:  
 
… She [employer] was very smart, she never paid me [overtime]. I worked for her 
for a year and three months and then her contract ended…I told her that I needed 
to register the house under my name and could use the extra money to do 
that…She said that she would compensate me… But when she left she just gave 
me $100. (Interview with Fernanda, 8 November 2011) 
 
Employers also have the privilege to refuse to dialogue, sometimes forcefully. Maria 
describes her employer’s reaction when she began to be more assertive: 
 
She perceived me as misbehaving because I stood up for myself. When I first 
started working there, she abused me and I would start crying… eventually I 
stopped crying. Then she got upset because I no longer cried. (Interview with 
Maria, 18 November 2011) 
 
Gifts and payments in kind are also an important source of remuneration for domestic 
workers. Tina became a domestic worker when her husband passed away. Her first 
employer, a Swedish woman, would purchased gifts for her and her four children, pay for 
incidentals, and even bought Tina a ticket to Sweden (Interview with Tina, 14 June 
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2012). However, gifts also often reinforce the unequal relationship between worker and 
employer. Ismael is in his early 20s. After moving from Beira to Maputo, he took a 
temporary job cleaning a boat. Soon after, his employer bought him a bike. When Ismael 
was dismissed, his employer demanded the bike back. Ismael refused. He explains why: 
 
He was the type of employer who was always controlling what you bought...So 
when I told him I was going to buy myself a bike, he said don’t worry, I’ll buy 
one for you. I even picked it out…He bought me the bike, I should keep it. 
(Interview with Ismael, 14 June 2012) 
 
Given the unequal employee-employer relationship, remuneration is often set at the 
employer’s whim. Decree 40/2008 does not stipulate a minimum wage for domestic 
workers. Given that employers’ incomes vary widely, the National Assembly argues that 
a minimum wage would undermine employer’s ability to secure care for the young and 
elderly, and cause mass retrenchments among domestic workers. The Sindicato Nacional 
de Empregados Domésticos (National Union of Domestic Workers—SINED) disagrees. 
A minimum wage is the only mechanism to address the extremely low wages in this 
sector. However, the Secretary General of the Associação de Empregados Domésticos de 
Moçambique (Mozambican Domestic Workers’ Association - AEDOMO) is concerned 
that a minimum wage could actually lower salaries.  
 
There may be opportunistic employers who currently pay above what a minimum 
wage would likely be. We have colleagues who earn Mts 3000, Mts 4000 or even 
Mts 5000 and I doubt that minimum wage in Mozambique for a domestic worker 
would be more than Mts 2000. Even if it got up to Mts 1500, that would be a 
favour. [If there was a minimum wage, employers] would be inclined to fire 
current workers, and hire new workers at a lower rate. (Interview with AEDOMO 
Secretary General, 09 July 2011) 
 
Varying wage determinations is one way to accommodate differences in geographical 
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5.4 Rest and Meals 
Decree 40/2008 mandates that domestic workers have a total of at least 30 minutes of rest 
during the workday (Boletim da República 2008). In contrast, Zimbabwean domestic 
workers are entitled to a meal break of at least 30 minutes, a lunch break of an hour and a 
tea break of 15 minutes (ILO 2012). While most respondents have access to breaks in 
theory, in practice employers’ expectations and the nature of the work, prevents them 
from resting. Josina explains: 
My patrão tells me that I am entitled to a 30-minute break but it’s impossible to 
take because of the intensity of work… Even a telephone needs to be 
recharged…if I’m able to, I rest in the corner for a few minutes because I get 
dizzy...If I’m resting my boss will come and order me around. He says one thing 
but he does another. (Interview with Josina, 16 June 2012) 
Lunch breaks are particularly challenging because in many households domestic workers 
are not allowed to eat the same food as the employer. Some employers provide a loaf of 
bread, others, yesterday’s leftovers. In some instances they purchase more substantial 
rations, though these tend to be of inferior quality. With no time to cook their own meals, 
most domestic workers labour from early in the morning until late in the evening without 
eating. While employers may agree to share food, in practice domestic workers have to 
negotiate access to meals on a daily basis. Fernanda explains: 
She [employer] would say “eat, eat, eat, everything you cook you should eat.” The 
moment I would take a little bit of food, she would come back and ask for that 
very same food I ate…How am I going to work if I’m feeling hungry? No one can 
do that… If the patroa is hungry, that same hunger will be felt by the worker. But 
I think employers think we’re animals. That we’re made out of iron. That we 
don’t feel hunger. That we’re just here to work like machines…That’s why many 
domestic workers steal. (Interview with Fernanda, 8 November 2011) 
 
5.5 Paid Leave 
According to Decree 40/2008 all domestic workers have the right to one day off a week, 
usually Sunday (Boletim da República 2008). In South Africa, domestic workers are 
entitled to 36 hours (ILO 2012). While most domestic workers have Sunday off, Maria, 
who became a domestic worker in the 1980s when she moved to Maputo as a refugee 
fleeing the civil war, had to negotiate for it:  
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When I first started, there were two of us and we would take turns. One would 
work Saturday, the other would work Sunday. After a while, we said no, we want 
to go to church on Sundays…She got angry. She didn’t want to have to stay home 
on Sundays...We insisted, we complained, we got angry, until she accepted that 
we would both get Sunday off. (Interview with Maria, 18 November 2011) 
Decree 40/2008 also mandates the right to 12 days of annual paid vacation in the first 
year, 24 days in the second year, and 30 days in the third year and thereafter. Workers 
can choose not to take their full vacation but must take at least five days off by law, and 
the employer is required to pay compensation for the forfeited days. Three quarters of 
respondents said that they did have access to paid holidays but it was up to the employer 
to decide when. The primary obstacle to taking time off is that many employers expect 
domestic workers to find a replacement. This means that domestic workers not only 
forfeit their wages but risk losing their jobs permanently. Filomena explains: 
If I want to go on holiday I need to find someone to take my place while I’m 
gone. When I come back they are supposed to leave... If my employers like them, 
it’s difficult to take that person out, and so I risk losing my job. That’s why I don’t 
take holiday time. (Interview with Filomena, 13 June 2012) 
According to Decree 40/2008, workers have the right to paid vacation after the first three 
months of employment, yet two respondents said that they had not taken time off because 
they had yet to complete a year with their employer. This suggests that respondents were 
misinformed about their rights.  
Decree 40/2008 further stipulates three paid sick days, 60 days of maternity leave, and 
five days for weddings and bereavements. Only two domestic workers in the sample have 
reliable access to paid sick days. Josina creatively negotiated paid sick days:  
He [employer] expected me to come back to work after going to the hospital. I 
would say yes, and sometimes pretend that I’d gotten confused, and go straight 
home. If they expected to me to leave the hospital and come straight back to work, 
they clearly didn’t treat me like I was sick. (Interview with Josina, 16 June 2012) 
Others have been less fortunate. Francisco has been working for the same family since 
1961, when he moved from Gaza Province to the city of Maputo. However, this year he 
was fired when he got sick and his employer refused to grant him paid sick days.  
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When I got sick, my employer didn’t give me paid time off. I brought receipts 
from the hospital, to show him that I was seriously sick but my patrão didn’t want 
to know about it, he didn’t accept it. (Interview with Francisco, 16 July 2011) 
Negotiating paid time off to attend funerals or weddings is particularly contentious. Isabel 
is in her mid-40s. Initially a homemaker, she became a domestic worker 12 years ago, 
when her husband could no longer make ends meet. She has been working for the same 
employer since. When her neighbour’s son passed away, she asked for time off to attend 
his funeral. This triggered a discussion. Angered by Isabel’s insistence, her employer 
dismissed her: 
 
I tried to negotiate with her [employer]. I told her that she could discount the day 
from my salary and that’s what she did. But she never paid me for that month, she 
fired me instead…She told me to leave her house, that I was giving her bad luck. I 
had been working for her for 12 years and she owed me my holidays and 
severance pay…To this day I haven’t received my pay. (Interview with Isabel, 16 
July 2011) 
 
5.6 Social Security 
Decree 40/2008 extends social security benefits including subsidised paid sick days, 
maternity leave, and pension to domestic workers. Registration with the Instituto 
Nacional de Segurança Social (National Institute of Social Security - INSS) is voluntary, 
and is the responsibility of the worker rather than employer. The employer and employee 
are expected to contribute four per cent and three per cent, respectively. SINED’s 
Secretary for Organising argues that this is impractical given domestic workers’ low 
wages and the unequal power relationship between employee and employer. Under the 
current system, domestic workers must convince employers to contribute to the fund 
regularly (Interview with SINED Secretary for Organising, 30 June 2011) 
None of the domestic workers interviewed in this study are registered with the INSS. 
Despite the fact that in 2008 the Mozambican state extended social protections to this 
sector, the Ministry of Labour has yet to issue guidelines for their incorporation. Only 
domestic workers who in their former profession had an INSS account, are able to make 
contributions. The co-founder of Celeste Hospitality, a personalised training and 
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placement agency for domestic workers, explains the challenge: 
I suggest to the employer that they pay social security. However, there is a 
problem. The Institute for Social Security doesn’t actually accept social security 
deposits for domestic workers because they have not written up the protocol yet. 
This is despite the fact that the 2008 law stipulates it. One of my clients wanted to 
contribute to social security but it was actually physically impossible to do so. 
(Interview with Celeste Hospitality Co-founder, 15 June 2012) 
 
5.7 Contracts 
Under Decree 40/2008 a written contract is not mandatory for domestic work. None of 
the respondents in the study, including union members, had a written contract. This 
corresponds to Chipenembe’s (2010) findings. It also reflects findings by Hertz (2004), 
Fish (2006), King (2007), Ally (2010), Bhorat (2010), and Du Preez (2010) on the 
formalisation of domestic work in South Africa.  
Respondents had different positions on the utility of a written contract. Graça, a domestic 
worker for over a decade, argues that only with a written contract can domestic workers 
defend themselves (Interview with Graça 18 November 2011).  Maria on the other hand 
feels intimidated by the legalistic language of contracts (Interview with Maria 18 
November 2011). Others are sceptical about whether written contracts can really protect 
them. According to Decree 40/2008 domestic workers can only rescind the contract if the 
employer forces them to perform illegal acts, if their rights as defined by the regulation 
are violated, if they are subject to abuse, or if their employer moves house. If a domestic 
worker rescinds the contract without due notification or just cause, they are liable to pay a 
fine to the employer. Filomena is opposed to a contractual relationship with her employer 
because it would undermine her individual agency. Given the unequal employee-
employer relationship, the ability to leave one’s job is an important option: 
For me to have a contract, I would need to have a guarantee about the conditions 
of work. I wouldn’t want to sign up for a contract without these. But it’s 
impossible to get these. (Interview with Filomena, 13 June 2012) 
 
In her study of the formalisation of domestic work in South Africa, Ally (2010) describes 
how some domestic workers refused to sign mandatory contracts, even when employers 
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implored them to. She attributes their refusal to sign as an attempt to preserve the familial 
relationship between employer and employee. However, Fernanda’s response suggests 
that there may be a more pragmatic reason. As Constable (1997) argues in her study of 
domestic workers in Hong Kong, refusing to sign a contract is a means of maintaining a 
level of autonomy over one’s work in a context where regulation is at least perceived as 
irrelevant or not enforced (Constable 1997).   
5.8 Health and Safety 
Decree 40/2008 emphasises employers’ rights to determine health and safety conditions. 
A remnant of the 1966 colonial regulation, it is concerned primarily with regulating 
domestic workers’ hygiene rather than establishing health and safety codes. For Josina 
this is a significant concern: 
I work meat and bones, absorbing toxic substances…When the patrão fumigates 
or paints the house they go on holiday, they stay in a hotel. But they expect that I 
should work. Then I get sick, have to go to hospital, and don’t have money to pay. 
 (Interview with Josina, 16 June 2012) 
 
Decree 40/2008 does stipulate that employers must compensate domestic workers for 
workplace-related injuries and illnesses. However, as with paid sick leave, respondents 
say that it depends on the employer’s mood. Maria’s has received small loans for hospital 
care, but these have been immediately deducted from her salary: 
 
If I got sick, really sick, I had to come into work, ask to go to the hospital, go to 
the hospital and then come back to work. She wouldn’t pay our medical bills. 
Sometimes you could ask her, “Please lend me Mts 50 ($2) to go to the hospital.” 
But I had to repay her. If I couldn’t repay her she would discount it from my 
salary at the end of the month. (Interview with Maria, 18 November 2011) 
 
Decree 40/2008 also states that domestic workers should be provided with adequate 
equipment to perform the required tasks. The definition of adequate equipment however, 
is left up to individual employers. In practice, domestic workers have little control over 
the physical environments in which they work.  
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5.9 Discrimination, Abuse and Humiliation 
According to Decree 40/2008, domestic workers have the right to be treated with respect 
and consideration. However, during interviews, domestic workers consistently mentioned 
that they experience high levels of discrimination, mistreatment and abuse. Fernanda 
describes her experience working for a Mozambican judge: 
She’s a racist; she’s black but racist. She wouldn’t allow me to drink water from 
her cup, to hold her spoon, to sit in the seat where she sits… You had to take off 
your shoes and hide them far away from her. She would say, “I don’t want your 
street shoes in my house. I don’t want your street clothes in my house, because 
they have bacteria.” But she wants you to do the work. What’s the difference? I 
touch her food and make it into a meal, and she eats it...Yes, that continues even 
after colonialism. (Interview with Fernanda, 8 November 2011) 
 
Like Fernanda, Josina finds employers’ generalised lack of respect paradoxical given the 
intimate nature and important contribution of domestic work to the household:  
 
We are the pillars of their households. We protect their belongings, their families, 
even the money they leave lying around. I raised a child from when he was born 
until he was ten. I was their second mother…yet we get no respect. We have the 
same blood running through our veins but we are treated as an alien species. 
(Interview with Josina, 16 June 2012) 
 
High levels of scrutiny as one of the defining characteristics of domestic work: 
You will never be able to do a good enough job alone, the house will never be 
clean…You have to look after the kids, you have to go cook, you have to clean 
the whole house. How can you do all of that in one day? This work never ends. 
(Interview with Maria, 18 November 2011)  
 
Finally, Maria adds, domestic work is characterised by humiliating tasks such as hand 
washing dirty underwear and cleaning intimate items: 
The worst thing is to force a domestic worker to wash dirty underwear, especially 
if the patroa is having her period or if you have to wash the underwear of a man 
with all his dirt. That’s what’s really horrible. That should not be done. Would she 
[the employer] accept washing someone else’s panties if she was a domestic 
worker? No. One’s dirt should never be passed onto someone else. Either you 
wash it yourself or put it in the washing machine. But employers insist that the 
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5.10 Criminalisation 
During fieldwork, a prison guard from the Maputo central jail came into the offices of 
AMUEDO. A domestic worker, he said, had been arrested for stealing and was currently 
locked up. Desperate to find her some help, he had stopped by on his way to work to see 
whether the association could intervene. The domestic worker, he said, claimed that her 
employers had set her up. A few days later, an employer walked into the SINED offices 
with her domestic worker who she said had stolen her hair extensions. Taking pity on her, 
the employer decided to take her to the union rather than the police station, in the hope 
that the union officials would administer a beating. These two anecdotes illustrate the 
important role that the police play as arbitrators of conflict. In the first three months of 
2012, employers accused 1300 workers of theft (Verdade 2012). Domestic workers rarely 
carry the same weight as employers in the eyes of the law. According to SINED’s 
Secretary General, the constant threat of criminalisation fosters a deep-seated fear among 
domestic workers and weakens their bargaining position: 
 
If you complain, or even think of complaining, they [employers] will retaliate by 
accusing you of taking something, just to prevent you from lodging a complaint.  
So as a domestic worker you’re stuck, the employer is the boss. (Interview with 
Fernanda, 8 November 2011) 
 
Seizing on this vulnerability, some domestic workers try to frame their colleagues in 
order to secure their own jobs. As a rule, Fernanda is always careful to disclose theft to an 
employer. This is not only ethically correct, but important if she is to protect her own 
position. New hires are particularly vulnerable. If an employer sees that belongings are 
missing, Fernanda argues, they are more likely to blame the new recruit.  
 
5.11 Juggling Tensions 
The majority of domestic workers interviewed in this study juggle competing tasks and 
priorities. They have a pecking order of bosses, the patrão or patroa at the top, each with 
their own concerns and approaches. According to Decree 40/2008, domestic workers 
must obey all orders, whether given by the employer or other members of the household. 
Juggling contradictory orders, personalities, and ever-changing family structures is 
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stressful, argues Teresa:   
I’m never sure who the boss is. Sometimes she pays me; sometimes he [nephew] 
pays me.... He has been spreading rumours that I steal food from the 
mashamba…That’s hurts me. I try to talk to madam but she doesn’t pay attention. 
He’s the one overseeing my work. (Interview with Teresa, 16 June 2012) 
Domestic workers also have to juggle tensions with colleagues. Decree 40/2008, obliges 
them to get along but this is not always easy, particularly in a precarious labour market 
such as Mozambique’s. Fernanda tries to pre-empt potential sources of tension: 
We don’t all have the same heart. There are some colleagues who want to 
undermine others, to safeguard their job or get my job. They try to ruin your 
work, to make you look bad in front of your employer…When I was hired, 
madam asked me whether I could cook but I saw that they already had a cook in 
the house so I said no, I don’t know how to cook. I didn’t want to undermine the 




Findings suggest that Decree 40/2008 has had little direct impact on working conditions. 
First, more than half of domestic workers interviewed had no knowledge of Decree 
40/2008. Second, in relation to labour protections in neighbouring countries, Decree 
40/2008 is weak. It does not stipulate a minimum wage. It mandates longer workdays, 
fewer meal breaks, and shorter weekends. It does not include occupational health and 
safety standards. It does not provide incentives for compliance. Written contracts are 
optional and there is no protocol for extending social protections to this historically 
marginalised sector. Disciplinary processes overwhelmingly favour the employer. Third, 
there is a mismatch between labour protections and the realities of domestic work. For 
instance, Decree 40/2008 stipulates a 30 minute meal break a day yet the nature of 
domestic work and of employers’ demands means that in reality domestic workers have 
difficulty in taking a break in the middle of the day. Fourth, domestic work is intimate 
work and negotiations over working conditions take place directly between worker and 
employer.  Institutionalised power relationships mean that employers have significant 
discretionary power. As Isabel reflects, “It really depends on the madam. Some are 
considerate…others inconsiderate” (Interview with Isabel, 16 July 2011). 
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In a context where regulation is at least perceived as irrelevant or unenforced, domestic 
workers resort to sometimes-contradictory forms of resistance and accommodation to 
advance their interests. On one hand, as Josina’s attempt to secure paid sick days 
illustrates, they use subtle forms of resistance to indirectly negotiate better working 
conditions. On the other hand they exhibit high levels of patience, preferring to wait for 
conditions to improve or better options to surface, than to make outright demands from 
employers. Given the unequal employee-employer relationship, the ability to leave one’s 
job is an important option for domestic workers. Consequently, some domestic workers 
see the written contract as a mechanism of control rather than a tool of liberation, and 
resist formalisation. Ultimately, Decree 40/2008 does not address the structural issues 
that funnel urban women and men into domestic work. Nonetheless for Josina Decree 
40/2008 is an important first step towards improving working conditions: 
We were treated as invisible, neutral. We knew we existed but the government 
didn’t recognise us. The state treated our work as voluntary work and therefore 
felt that they didn’t have to provide any labour protections. (Interview with 
Josina, 16 June 2012) 
Chapter 6 explores the role of state and non-state institutions in enforcing Decree 
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CHAPTER 6 
 
REGULATING THE “PATIENCE INDUSTRY”: 
 
OPPORTUNITIES AND LIMITATIONS  
 
 “The state is our patrão. They don’t want to listen to us. They say they’ll discuss our rights next week but I 
have a wound inside that has not healed. We want our own rights.”  
-SINED General Secretary, Seminar on Convention 189, (11/12/2011) 
6.1 Introduction 
It has been three years since Mozambique extended labour protections to domestic 
workers and the Secretary General of the Sindicato Nacional de Empregados Domésticos 
(National Union of Domestic Workers - SINED) is frustrated by the limited impact of 
Decree 40/2008. To her, the state is like an employer; oppressive and manipulative but 
necessary. The irony is not lost on the audience of domestic workers. The majority of 
bureaucrats and policy-makers that make up the state apparatus are themselves 
employers.  
 
Chipenembe (2010) attributes the limited impact of Decree 40/2008 to the absence of 
regulatory institutions. However, this chapter illustrates that there is in fact a budding 
regulatory framework made up of state institutions such as the Comissão de Mediação e 
Arbitragem Laboral (Commission for Labour Mediation and Arbitration - COMAL), the 
Inspectorate, the Labour Courts, and the Instituto de Patrocínio e Advocacia Jurídica 
(Institute for Legal Aid and Advocacy - IPAJ); non-governmental legal service providers; 
private training and placement agencies; and perhaps most importantly, domestic 
workers’ organisations.  
 
The more interesting question therefore is not whether formal institutions exist but how 
these institutions of regulation, protection, and opposition both enable and constrain the 
extension of labour protections to domestic workers. Through an institution-by-institution 
analysis, this chapter maps the regulatory context in which domestic workers operate and 
the ways in which domestic workers leverage institutions to advance their interests.  
   
Fig 5 Institutional map of Maputo’s complaints mechanism
6.2 Labour Courts
While Decree 18/92 mandates the creation of Labour Courts, these have yet to be 
constructed. Labour-related disputes are settled within the labour section of the Maputo 
Court. The Labour Court is the point of last resort for domestic workers. Only cases that 
have already go ne through mediation are accepted. In reality, few cases get to this level 
(Interview with Maputo Labour Division Judge, 13 July 2011) for a number of reasons. 
First the majority of employees and employers are not aware of Decree 40/2008
(Chipenembe 2010). The state has done little to educate domestic workers, employers and 
state officials about regulation. Instead it has relied on under -resourced unions and 
workers’ associations to perform this role. AMUEDO General Secretary explains:
MITRAB  [ the Ministry of Labour] did no outreach. They received money from 
the ILO to outreach but they have done nothing to support us in reaching out to 
the base of domestic workers. They didn’t even give us the 100 copies of 
regulation they promised us. (Interview with AMUEDO General, Secretary 1 July 
2011)
Second, the majority of cases are resolved through mediation and conciliation.  Domestic 
workers are generally able to win stronger benefits during mediation because employers 
are eager to settle case s and thus more w illing to give in to domestic workers’ demands 
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(Interview with Maputo Labour Division Judge, 13 July 2011). In contrast, Labour Court 
decisions must follow the letter of the law. Under Decree 40/2008 the burden of proof 
lies with the accuser, most frequently the domestic worker. Without a written contract, 
domestic workers find it difficult to substantiate their arguments.  
 
Ismael submitted a case against his employer for Mts 21,000 in severance pay and back 
wages. His employer, claims that Ismael was a domestic worker. However, Ismael 
disputed this, arguing that he was a seaman because his primary function was to clean his 
employer’s boat. The boat was part of his residence, contends the employer, who said that 
Ismael did not possess the skills to navigate a boat. With no formal contract, his employer 
called Ismael’s neighbour and former colleague as a witness to corroborate the story. The 
judge ruled that Ismael was indeed a domestic worker.  
 
Third, costs are prohibitive. In order to schedule a hearing, the accuser has to pay a fee. 
Judges can waive this fee but the process is complicated and few claimants are aware of it 
(Interview with Maputo Labour Division Judge, 13 July 2011). Supporting documents 
include a contract, and pay stubs, a personal declaration, and proof of hardship are 
required. 
 
Fourth, though legal representation is not necessary, even well trained union mediators 
feel that they need guidance from lawyers to navigate the judicial process (Interview with 
SINED Secretary for International Relations 30 July 2011). In theory, the Instituto de 
Patrocínio e Advocacia Jurídica (Legal Aid and Advocacy Institute - IPAJ) should legal 
assistance, but as will be discussed later, there are chronic problems. 
 
Finally, the process is lengthy. As CONSILMO Labour and Legal Affairs Secretary 
explains, there was a backlog of 15,000 cases: 
 Therefore it was improbable that your case would ever be heard. It became clear 
that if the cases were simple, the courts should declare themselves incompetent of 
dealing with the situation. Not incompetency in terms of training but in terms of 
capacity to resolve the issue. (Interview with CONSILMO Secretary for Labour 
and Legal Affairs, 1 February 2012) 
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6.3 Inspectorate 
Decree 40/2008 tasks the Inspectorate General with enforcement. The Inspectorate is not 
mandated to carry out workplace inspections but is responsible for following up on verbal 
or written complaints made by domestic workers. In reality, the Inspectorate handles very 
few domestic workers’ cases (Interview with Labour Inspector Maputo Division, 1 
February 2012).  First, with the establishment of COMAL, non-criminal labour disputes 
are no longer dealt with at the inspectorate. Criminal cases such as sexual assault are 
forwarded to the Labour Court. 
Second, mediation is more desirable because it offers the opportunity for reconciliation, 
thereby preserving the employment relationship: 
We used to submit cases to the Inspectorate but when the inspector would go to 
the house, the employer would say that there wasn’t a problem. The inspector 
would go away and then the employer would find some reason to get rid of the 
worker. Sometimes domestic workers would be physically abused, other times the 
employer would call the police and send domestic workers to jail. So the union 
felt that mediation and conciliation was a better avenue to ensure that workers did 
not lose their jobs. (Interview with SINED Secretary for International Relations, 
30 July 2011) 
 
Third, inspectors neither have the mandate nor capacity to inspect the tens of thousands 
of private homes that employ domestic workers. There are approximately 120 inspectors 
across Mozambique, working on roughly 11,000 cases annually (Interview with Labour 
Inspector Maputo Division, 1 February 2012). In contrast, in South Africa inspectors 
have the right to inspect private homes and carry out raids (ILO 2012).  
Finally, the absence of standards in relation to minimum wage, tasks performed, and 
occupational health and safety, make this a difficult sector to regulate. 
 
When you inspect a factory you go to one place where there are a lot of workers. 
You want to make sure that the working conditions are up to standard, that 
Occupation Health and Safety is followed. But with domestic work, you have one 
worker in one workplace, each employer is very different from the other, workers 
work in a private space, and there are no standards. (Interview with Labour 
Inspector Maputo Division, 1 February 2012) 
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6.4 Commission for Labour Mediation and Arbitration (COMAL) 
Decree 50/2009 set up COMAL. Fashioned after South Africa’s Commission for 
Conciliation, Mediation and Arbitration (CCMA), COMAL is an autonomous, tripartite 
institution with in theory, equal parts representation from the state, unions, and 
employers. In 2010, it began to operate in earnest. The role of mediation is to broker a 
binding consensual agreement between the employee and employer. By law, no 
agreement can be worse than the benefits established in the regulation. In practice 
however, the law is not applied in a rigorous manner. If for instance a worker is owed 
severance, and the law mandates that she get ten days for every year worked, but they 
agree to seven days, COMAL accepts it. A COMAL mediator describes the challenge of 
reaching consensus: 
 
Most times, the relationship between the employer and the employee is already 
very bad…They sit down, I listen first to the worker’s side of the story, then to the 
employer’s. We try to find consensus regardless of who is guilty, of who is 
responsible. (Interview with COMAL Mediator-Maputo Section, 8 April 2012) 
 
The most common sectors are security guards, domestic workers, retail workers, and 
hotel workers. The most common issues are dismissal without just cause, unpaid wages, 
and accusations of theft (Interview with COMAL Mediator-Maputo Section, 8 April 
2012). Though statistics are not readily available, between January 2010 and April 2011, 
COMAL oversaw 9 297 cases. Of these, 64 per cent ended in agreements, 11 per cent are 
current cases, and 25 per cent resulted in an impasse (Interview with OTM Head of Legal 
Labour and Social Affairs, 5 July 2011). If no agreement is reached the mediator declares 
an impasse, and cases should in theory be forwarded to arbitration. Currently there no 
arbitration section due to lack of trained staff so cases are referred directly to the Labour 
Court (Interview with COMAL Mediator-Maputo Section, 8 April 2012). 
 
Overall, key informants feel that COMAL has been a tremendous success. First, it is a 
quick and affordable way to deal with labour disputes. Workers do not have to pay a fee 
to open a case against an employer and a resolution at COMAL is often found within 30 
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days. Previously conflicts were mediated either via the inspectorate, overburdened-
Labour Courts, or most commonly, the police. 
 
Second, workers do not need to be represented by a lawyer. In fact, mediations are often 
more successful if lawyers are absent: 
 
Lawyers often feel that if they reach impasse and go to court, they will win the 
case, or else the case will be forgotten. The informal character of mediation can 
lead to more successful resolutions.  (Interview with OTM Head of Legal Labour 
and Social Affairs, 5 July 2011) 
 
Finally, mediation seeks to rekindle the relationship between employer and employee, 
which is critical to safeguarding domestic workers’ jobs. Particularly in cases of unpaid 
wages, both parties are able to reconcile and the worker is able to return to work 
(Interview with COMAL Mediator-Maputo Section, 8 April 2012).  
 
However, workers’ organisations and domestic workers argue that COMAL still has a 
long way to go. First, employers often retard the process by refusing to accept the 
summons. Under the current system, domestic workers are responsible for handing the 
summons to the employer. Given the unequal power relationships between employer and 
employee, it is often a challenge to get the employer to take the summons seriously. Even 
when the union intervenes, some employers dismiss them, (Interview with SINED 
Secretary for International Relations, 30 July 2011). According to the law, the police can 
be enlisted to escort employers to COMAL. However the mediator argues that the police 
rarely assume this role. When COMAL becomes fully functional, it will be responsible 
for summoning the employer directly (Interview with COMAL Mediator-Maputo 
Section, 8 April 2012).  For now, if the employer refuses to attend mediation, COMAL 
issues a second and then a third summons. It is a criminal offence to dismiss the 
summons, and if the employer refuses to attend for the third time, the case is forwarded to 
the Labour Court. For a domestic worker seeking a quick resolution however, this is not 
the ideal outcome (Interview with OTM Head of Legal Labour and Social Affairs, 5 July 
2011).  
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Second, though lodging a claim is free, it requires time and money. Virginia is a mother 
of two small children. When her employer of three years fired her, she went to COMAL 
to claim her severance pay. However, she did not have the resources to collect and submit 
the necessary documents and eventually gave up: 
 
…They told me I had to go to Matola, which is where I was working at the time. 
At the time I didn’t have money to take transport to Matola, get this document 
from here; that document from there. I couldn’t do it. So I never did get 
severance. (Interview with Virginia, 30 January 2012) 
 
Third, in a context where few domestic workers have a written contract and where the 
burden of proof rests on the domestic worker, workers struggle to provide sufficient 
evidence to make their cases. After almost 16 years working for the same family, Maria 
was fired without just cause. With help from SINED she filed a case for severance pay. 
The law says that domestic workers are entitled to 10 days of severance for every year 
worked. Maria’s employer argued that Maria worked there for only 12 years. The 
mediator suggested a compromise of 14 years. Maria conceded. Once the severance was 
calculated, the employer said that she would like to pay it over the course of a year. The 
mediator rejected this, suggesting three months. Maria again conceded.  At the end, Maria 
reflects on her experience: 
 
She was outrageous. I raised her daughter and now she’s pretending that she 
didn’t know how long I worked for her. She can afford to pay it to me all in one 
go, but she doesn’t want to because she still wants to control me. She doesn’t 
want me to take this money and make something of my life. Instead she hopes 
that I will spend it slowly and have nothing left in the end. I feel sorry for her... If 
it weren’t for the union I wouldn’t have pursued this case… When I tried to 
negotiate severance with her before, she told me she was going to take me to the 
police station where I would be whipped. (Interview with Maria, 18 November 
2011) 
 
Fifth, mediators have not received training on Decree 40/2008. In fact, according to one 
mediator, the Ministry of Labour did not even disseminate copies of the regulation 
(Interview with COMAL Mediator-Maputo Section, 8 April 2012). Mediators must 
personally purchase copies, study them and interpret them to the best of their abilities. 
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Interpretation of the Decree 40/2008 is particularly difficult given the vague and 
sometimes contradictory nature of clauses. For instance, workers technically are not 
eligible for severance pay if they are fired without just cause (Boletim da República 
2008). Sometimes, argues the mediator, domestic workers assume that they are entitled to 
benefits when in fact they are not. This fuels the sentiment among domestic workers that 
regulatory institutions are rife with corruption, further undermining these.  
 
Finally, though mediations can result in conciliation, the conflict between employer and 
employee often escalates to the point of no return. Six months after Maria’s mediation, 
she is now working for a different employer. Asked how she felt about the mediation 
process she responds: 
 
I feel good because she had to pay me. It’s true that the amount of money was 
very little, but I’ve put the whole thing behind me. The money she gave me, is the 
money I used to buy bread. (Interview with Maria, 18 November 2011) 
 
6.5 Legal Service Providers 
Some domestic workers do seek legal assistance. There are a number of legal service 
providers in the city. The Centro de Práctica Jurídica  (CPJ) is a free law clinic attached 
to the Eduardo Mondlane University. Here, law students provide legal representation and 
perform mediations. If no resolution is reached, CPJ refers the case to COMAL. 
Associação Mulher Lei e Desenvolvimento (Women, Law and Development Association - 
MULEIDE), a local non-governmental organisation, provides legal services to women. 
MULEIDE’s goal is to get the domestic worker rehired. In cases where a worker needs to 
retire, they try to negotiate for the employer to hire one of their children so that the family 
can maintain their income. If the employment relationship is severed, MULEIDE seeks to 
negotiate severance (Interview with MULEIDE Lawyer, 7 December 2012).  
 
Workers’ organisations have sought to partner with legal service providers. However, the 
low profit margins and tedious process means that many lawyers are unwilling to follow 
up on commitments (Interview with AMUEDO General Secretary, 1 July 2011). IPAJ is 
a national government-run legal aid centre responsible for providing legal services to 
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low-income Mozambicans. However, the agency has been plagued by problems. Lawyers 
frequently miss hearings and appointments. Limited financial incentives mean that 
lawyers have in the past demanded bribes from clients who technically cannot afford 
lawyers. While IPAJ is an important initiative, the majority of Mozambicans do not have 
adequate representation in the justice system (Nahe, Mabota et al. 2009). 
 
6.6 Training and Placement Agencies 
Domestic worker training and placement agencies have become increasingly important in 
Maputo. One such agency is Hospitality Celeste, which provides high-end services 
including recruitment and training to expatriates (Interview with Celeste Hospitality Co-
founder, 15 June 2012). Working conditions are negotiated directly between the employer 
and employee, though Hospitality Celeste does provide information on domestic workers’ 
rights and responsibilities to both parties. According to the company’s co-founder, by 
professionalising domestic work, providing trainees with a certificate, and helping them 
develop a network of references, working conditions can improve. Asked whether she 
would consider partnering with a union, she says no:  
 
I think collaborating with unions would make me partial to workers. If there was 
an association that was not associated with the labour movement I may work with 
them, but not unions. (Interview with Celeste Hospitality Co-founder, 15 June 
2012) 
 
Hospitality Celeste is one of a handful of companies that provide training and placement 
services. Mãos e Artes, did partner with SINED in the past. According to SINED, the 
union would funnel members to Mãos e Artes for training, and the latter would funnel 
trainees to the union when there was conflict with employers (Interview with SINED 
Secretary for Organising, 30 June 2011). This relationship soon disintegrated but 
nonetheless provides a model for how to merge the twin objectives of access to work and 
improvements in working conditions. 
 
AMUEDO has also experimented with running a training and placement agency. 
However, this initiative has been plagued by a lack of resources. Despite good intentions, 
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AMUEDO’s training and placement agency has yet to get off the ground. Domestic 
workers would “rather pay Mts 10 0000 to take a course at the Escola Andalucía, which 
has a much narrower but more renowned training program” (Interview with AMUEDO 
General Secretary, 1 July 2011). 
 
6.7 Workers’ Organisations 
Three organisations in Maputo represent domestic workers: the Associação de 
Empregados Domésticos de Moçambique (Mozambican Domestic Workers’ Association 
- AEDOMO); the Associação das Mulheres Empregadas Domésticas (Women’s 
Association of Domestic Workers - AMUEDO); and the Sindicato Nacional de 
Empregados Domésticos (National Union of Domestic Workers - SINED). All three are 
affiliated with organised labour.  
 
Maputo’s first association of domestic workers was AMUEDO. Formalised in 2006, 
AMUEDO was founded by its current Secretary General, a former leader in the 
Organização dos Trabalhadores Moçambicanos (Mozambican Workers’ Organisation - 
OTM) After attending an organising training on behalf of the labour federation, she 
clandestinely registered a domestic workers’ association and began to recruit domestic 
workers. When OTM found out she was suspended and instead affiliated her association 
with the rival federation, the Confederação Nacional dos Sindicatos Independentes e 
Livres de Moçambique (National Federation of Independent and Democratic Unions-
CONSILMO) (Interview with AMUEDO General Secretary, 1 July 2011). 
 
AMUEDO claims to have 7990 members, of which 320 are men. It is based in the city of 
Maputo, and operates in six provinces, each with its own coordinator. AMUEDO was 
involved in crafting Decree 40/2008. Currently it has four branches of activity: 
membership recruitment, conflict resolution, mobilisation, and a training and placement 
agency that has yet to be actualised. 
 
After AMUEDO affiliated with CONSILMO, the Organização dos Trabalhadores 
Moçambicanos (Organisation of Mozambican Workers - OTM) founded its own 
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domestic workers’ association, the Associação de Empregados Domésticos de 
Moçambique (Mozambican Domestic Workers’ Association - AEDOMO) (Interview 
with COMUTRA Coordinator, 23 June 2012). While AMUEDO maintains that the 
creation of AEDOMO was an attempt by OTM to carve out a space in domestic worker 
organising and to undermine their work, AEDOMO argues that this was a natural process 
for OTM: 
 
In past years domestic workers who were laid off or had problems in the 
workplace would go to OTM for help. So OTM decided that it would be better to 
create some kind of structure that could advocate for the domestic sector. 
(Interview with AEDOMO Secretary General, 09 July 2011) 
 
AEDOMO claims to have 800 members, 104 of which are men. Dues are Mts10 a month. 
AEDOMO did not participate in the elaboration of Decree 40/2008. AEDOMO’s work 
consists of raising awareness about domestic workers’ rights, membership recruitment, 
and mediation. If a domestic worker comes to the association with a problem, AEDOMO 
first asks them to try and negotiate directly with the employer. If the problem cannot be 
resolved directly between the employer and employee, AEDOMO requests that the 
employer attend a mediation. If no solution is found, the case is forwarded to COMAL. 
AEDOMO’s emphasis is on conciliation. If mediation results in impasse, their lawyer 
submits a petition to the Labour Court. 
 
At every point in the conflict resolution process, we try to come to a resolution, to 
prevent, to the greatest extent possible, the case from going forward to the next 
stage. (Interview with AEDOMO Secretary, General 09 July 2011) 
 
SINED was formed informally in 2006 when a dozen domestic workers, street traders, 
and young organisers began to meet regularly at the Sal do Mundo Church in the working 
class suburb of Urbanização. SINED experienced significant growing pains, and by 2007 
the majority of members left because they felt that the group had neither the capacity nor 
competency to develop a union (Interview with SINED Secretary General 30 June 2012). 
Eventually with the help of a lawyer, SINED was formalised in 2008. Shortly after, it 
affiliated with OTM. SINED claims to have 2035 members in four provinces. Dues are 1 
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per cent of workers’ salaries. SINED did not participate in developing Decree 40/2008. 
Its initial focus was on promoting professionalisation through a partnership with the 
training and placement agency, Mãos e Artes. Currently, the union has three pillars of 
work:  membership recruitment, mediation, and mobilisation. SINED organisers outreach 
to domestic workers at a taxi rank three times a week.  
 
Maintaining a constant presence is very important. It’s not only about recruiting 
members. It’s also about helping domestic workers navigate problems at work. 
This establishes confidence in the union. (Interview with SINED, Executive 
Secretary for Maputo 4 July 2012) 
 
Photo 1 SINED members proudly display their union id cards 
 
Credit: Ruth Castel-Branco 
 
Members in good standing can access the union’s mediation services for free, non-
members 15 per cent of the settlement. Much like AMUEDO and AEDOMO, SINED’s 
focus is on conciliation not confrontation. Only a small fraction of cases go to COMAL: 
No one wins if a domestic worker is dismissed. So we first encourage workers to 
think about ways to de-escalate the situation by communicating with their 
employer on one-on-one basis. If it comes to mediation, we speak in a soft tone; 
we try to understand employers’ point of view; we try to remind both parties of 
the long history they’ve had together. (Interview with SINED Secretary for 
International Relations, 30 July 2011) 
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Workers’ organisations have played a critical role in enforcing Decree 40/2008. Through 
training, organising, and direct action, they have increased the visibility of this 
historically marginalised sector, organised politically around key demands, and sought to 
change how employers perceive domestic workers. Workers’ organisations also provide 
valuable mediation services, vastly reducing the number of cases lodged with COMAL 
and speeding up the conflict-resolutions process.  
 
However unions face many constraints. First, the labour movement is splintered. The 
three workers’ organisations, AEDOMO, AMUEDO and SINED, do not communicate, 
let alone collaborate, with each other. Instead they spend significant energy and time 
reinventing the wheel, in the context of very limited resources. Competition between 
organisations have made some domestic workers wary of joining unions explains SINED 
Executive Secretary of the National Council of Youth Domestic Workers: 
 
Some workers refuse to talk to us. Even if we talk nicely to them they dismiss 
us…Frankly I understand it. They don’t trust us. Since we started mobilising 
publicly, recruitment has gotten easier because they see that we’re serious. 
(Interview  with SINED Executive Secretary of the National Council of Youth 
Domestic Workers, 4 July 2012) 
 
The absence of collaboration is perplexing given organisations’ almost identical 
demands, strategies, and tactics. OTM has attempted to merge its affiliates, SINED and 
AEDOMO, but SINED is reluctant. Given the labour federation’s tight control over 
AEDOMO, SINED fears that a merger would ultimately undermine their autonomy at the 
very moment when they are expanding (Interview with SINED Secretary for Organising 
30 June 2011). Domestic worker organising has become a battleground for autonomy, 
power and resources. Despite ILO prodding, AMUEDO is unwilling to collaborate with 
any OTM affiliate: 
 
I started first. SINED and AEDOMO don’t know anything. OTM has set them up 
to demoralise and weaken AMUEDO. (Interview with AMUEDO General 
Secretary, 1 July 2011) 
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A second obstacle is fear. Domestic workers are scared of joining a union or association, 
and even more scared of talking about it with their employers for fear of losing their jobs.  
Eliza became a domestic worker five years ago after her husband was retrenched. Though 
he initially approved, he became increasingly unhappy with her choice because of the 
long hours. Eliza is proud that she can be the primary breadwinner in her family. She 
joined the SINED because she believes that only through the union can working 
conditions improve. However, many domestic workers disagree: 
 
Domestic workers treat the union with a certain amount of contempt. They say, oh 
we are not interested in joining, everything is going well with my boss. But well, 
that isn’t really the truth. But since they are working, and they accept whatever 
treatment they get. (Interview with Eliza, 1 July 2011) 
 
SINED has tried to counter this fear by encouraging members to talk to employers about 
their rights and membership in the union.  However, in the context of power disparities, 
employers rarely create a space for dialogue. AEDOMO Secretary General explains: 
  
I would give domestic workers the regulation and tell them, “Give it to the guard. 
After a few days, the guard should hand it to the employer and say that someone 
from the domestic worker’s association stopped by to deliver it.” One of the 
women did exactly that. In response her employer said, “Go tell the association 
that this regulation is out of date. There is a new law that regulates domestic work 
but it’s not this shit. Go tell the association that they need to get their facts 
straight.” The next time I went to the corner, domestic workers were furious. 
Humiliated, they felt like I gave them an out of date document just to trick them. 
(Interview with AEDOMO Secretary General 09 July 2011) 
 
Domestic workers are further dissuaded from joining the union by documentation 
requirements. Though Filomena lives and works across from the AMUEDO offices, she 
has not officially become a member because she does not have her ID card (Interview 
with Filomena, 13 June 2012). 
 
The fourth obstacle is that workers’ organisation have limited resources. Low salaries, no 
ability to deduct dues automatically, and limited capacity to collect dues from members 
on a regular basis, mean that workers’ organisations have difficulty in adequately 
servicing their members, organising new workers, and following through on campaign 
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programs. All three organisations have developed alternative sources of income. 
AEDOMO provides mediation services for non-members at a fee of 10 per cent of the 
settlement. AMUEDO has secured a grant from the Norwegian Embassy. SINED has 
secured grants from both the International Domestic Workers’ Network (IDWN) and the 
International Trade Union Confederation (ITUC). The reliance of foreign donors is 
symptomatic of the broader Mozambican labour movement, and has repercussions for 
unions’ political programs: 
 
Each donor has its own philosophy, its own programme that it will fund, so we 
generally try to be flexible, to gear our programme to what is being funded. 
(Interview with OTM Secretary for Internal Organising, 5 July 2011) 
 
A final challenge for all three organisations is leadership development. AEDOMO is 
dominated by OTM. AMUEDO is dominated by a charismatic General Secretary who has 
transformed the association into a family enterprise in which her children serve as 
administrative assistants. SINED has developed more concrete roles and responsibilities 
within the union structure. Over time, these have shifted as organisers’ commitments 
change. SINED relies heavily on worker leaders like Josina to help organise actions: 
 
You have to be an active member. We want to move this union forward, to 
expand…from Rovuma to Maputo. Many of our colleagues are really suffering 
and they have nowhere to go, they don’t know that there’s a union.”  (Interview 
with Josina, 16 June 2012) 
 
6.8 Conclusion  
This chapter suggests that there are some structural limitations to the current institutional 
framework for regulating and protecting paid domestic work. The Labour Courts 
continue to be heavily backlogged; the inspectorate neither has a mandate nor the 
capacity to inspect the tens of thousands of homes that employ domestic workers, and the 
state legal aid centres are plagued by scandals and lack resources to meet the demand.  
 
However, this study also identifies grounds for optimism. First, though still relatively 
young, COMAL has provided a quick and affordable mechanism to resolve conflicts 
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between workers and employers. COMAL’s emphasis on reconciliation may in rare 
instances help to preserve the employment relationship. Interventions therefore, should be 
targeted at strengthening this institution. Second, Decree 40/2008 has also galvanised 
domestic worker organising, creating a focus of mobilisation and advocacy with the 
potential to profoundly affect working conditions in this sector. Workers’ organisations 
play a critical role in securing de facto rights for domestic workers. In contrast to Ally’s 
(2010) analysis of the formalisation of domestic work in South Africa, the findings in this 
chapter suggest that the extension of labour protections to domestic workers has not 
undermined their individual or collective agency. However, in the context of a fractured 
labour movement, domestic worker organising has become a battleground for autonomy, 
power and resources. It is still too early to know whether domestic workers will 
ultimately benefit.  
 
As Chen (2011) argues, formalisation is on-going process in which the terms must be 
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CHAPTER 7 
CONCLUSION 
 “They don’t have a problem with the status quo. It’s us that need to fight, that need to get them to 
understand, we need to start a profound dialogue with them. It’s us who need to do it.” 
 -Interview with Josina (16 June 2012) 
7.1 Introduction 
It is June 16th 2012, the first International Domestic Workers’ Day and Josina is among 
the dozens of workers gathered at the symbolic Praça dos Heróis to demand that the 
Mozambican state ratify ILO Convention 189. In a tradition usually reserved for officially 
recognised public holidays, she lays a wreath at the monument commemorating 
Mozambique’s fallen heroes, before leading the group in song: “My father is a garden 
boy, my mother is a kitchen girl, that’s why I’m a unionist, I’m a unionist, I’m a 
unionist.” Originally a South African hymn, it has been adapted to a Mozambican 
audience; a reflection of the transnational linkages that have emerged with support from 
the International Domestic Workers’ Network (IDWN), African Domestic Workers’ 
Network (ADWN) and the International Trade Union Confederation (ITUC). Looking 
over at the crowd, Josina feels encouraged. Two employers have come to support the 
action. While labour protections are useful, she argues, it is domestic workers who will 
ultimately transform this historically marginalised and undervalued sector.  
This chapter revisits the debate on the relationship between legislation, collective action, 
and domestic workers’ individual agency in the introductory section of this study. 
Drawing on the results, it reflects on the opportunities and limitations of legislating 
worker justice in an intimate profession. 
 
7.2 Legislating Worker Justice in an Intimate Profession 
While it is still too early to gauge the full impact of Decree 40/2008, this study suggests it 
has had only limited effect on domestic workers’ working conditions in Maputo. Its 
ambiguous language, poor dissemination, and weak regulatory structure, combined with 
the precarious nature of Maputo’s labour market and entrenched power relations between 
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workers and employers, mean that domestic workers exhibit high levels of 
accommodation or patience, preferring to wait for conditions to improve or better options 
to surface, than to make outright demands from employers. The state has relied heavily 
on under-resourced workers’ organisations to disseminate Decree 40/2008. 
Consequently, neither the majority of workers nor employers are aware of the regulation. 
Given the entrenched employee-employer power differential, a well-resourced, state-led, 
public dissemination campaign is necessary.  
 
Furthermore, in comparison to neighbouring countries, Decree 40 is weak. It does not 
stipulate a minimum wage. It mandates longer workdays, fewer meal breaks, and shorter 
weekends than neighbouring countries; it does not include occupational health and safety 
standards; written contracts are optional; disciplinary processes overwhelmingly favour 
the employer; and there are no incentives for either workers or employers to comply with 
the law. In a context where few domestic workers have written contracts and where the 
burden of proof rests on the worker rather than on the employer, employers hold the 
balance of power. The ratification of Convention 189 may provide grounds to amend 
Decree 40/2008, specifically in relation to a minimum wage, disciplinary procedures, the 
role of labour inspectors, and social security protocols.  
In addition, there is a mismatch between Decree 40/2008 and the realities of domestic 
work. Domestic work is intimate work and negotiations over working conditions take 
place directly between worker and employer. State interventions need to address this 
power imbalance through inspection and enforcement. With the shift away from 
inspection to mediation, employers face fewer penalties. While mediation may help 
preserve the employment relationship in theory, only in rare cases do domestic workers 
go back to work. Rather the current institutional framework allows domestic workers at 
best to secure a few months of severance pay. Strategies of formalisation need to be 
adapted to the peculiarities of domestic work. 
There is also a mismatch between the letter of the law and the protocols put in place to 
enforce it. The Labour Courts have not been fully operationalised. Mediators have neither 
received copies of the regulation nor training on Decree 40/2008. Arbitrators have not 
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been trained. The police rarely assume their role in summoning employers to mediation. 
Inspectors neither have a mandate nor the capacity to inspect the tens of thousands of 
private homes that employ domestic workers. The majority of the population does not 
have access to the legal justice system either in the courts, or in the police stations. Rather 
than concluding that labour protections are of no use, this chapter suggests that state 
interventions matter, and can play an important role if crafted correctly. As Chen (2011) 
argues, labour standards need to be negotiated and renegotiated by employers, workers, 
and the state. 
 
Ultimately, it is important to recognise the limitations of labour protections. Decree 
40/2008 does not address the structural issues that funnel women and men into domestic 
work. For most of the respondents, becoming a domestic worker was not a choice. 
Rather, it was a response to the limited opportunities during moments of crisis. In a 
precarious labour market such as Mozambique’s, domestic workers exhibit high levels of 
patience. Rather than negotiating working conditions upfront, they prefer to build rapport 
with employers. If employers refuse to improve conditions, the domestic workers’ 
primary practice of power is to leave. However, in the context of limited opportunities, 
they often fall back on patience.  
 
7.3 State Power and Domestic Workers’ Agency  
In her analysis of the formalisation of paid domestic work in South Africa, Ally (2010) 
argues that labour protections can have a detrimental impact on domestic workers’ 
individual and collective agency. First, as contractual rights and responsibilities replace 
the intimate employee-employer relationship, domestic workers may find that they have 
less flexibility to negotiate working conditions. However, this study challenges the notion 
that labour protections necessarily disempower domestic workers. Because conditions are 
negotiated on a one-on-one basis with employers, its implementation is ultimately 
dependent on domestic workers’ active participation. This study suggests that there may 
be a more pragmatic reason for refusing to sign a contract. Given the unequal employee-
employer relationship, the ability to leave one’s job is an important option for domestic 
workers. Under Decree 40/2008, domestic workers are liable to pay a fine if they quit 
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without just cause. Paradoxically, they are not eligible for severance pay if they are fired 
without just cause. In a context where regulation is at least perceived as irrelevant or 
unenforced, domestic workers may see a written contract as a mechanism of control 
rather than a tool of liberation.  
 
Furthermore, Decree 40/2008 has provided a focus around which domestic workers can 
collectively mobilise, organise, and advocate. Since its elaboration, the number of 
organisations representing domestic workers has proliferated. The current campaign 
around the ratification of Convention 189 has the potential to further strengthen 
organising by providing a space for collaboration among rival organisations, an 
opportunity to build alliances with unions and non-governmental groups, a chance to 
educate funders about domestic workers, and to propose state interventions. Far from a 
hegemonic force, formalisation is a slow on-going process, which incorporates varying 
forms of formality (Chen 2011). 
7.4 Collective Action and Workers’ Organisations  
Given the limited impact of Decree 40/2008, domestic workers’ informal strategies and 
tactics are the primary mechanism by which workers negotiate working conditions. 
Workers’ organisations play a crucial role in securing improvements in their working 
conditions. Through know your rights training, strategy group sessions, and one-on-one 
conversations, workers’ organisations mobilise members to negotiate around common 
demands. As Parreñas (2001) reflects, if individual acts of defiance take place at a 
collective level, they can also take on a collective character. 
 
Three organisations in Maputo represent domestic workers: the Associação de 
Empregados Domésticos de Moçambique (Mozambican Domestic Workers’ Association 
- AEDOMO); the Associação das Mulheres Empregadas Domésticas (Women’s 
Association of Domestic Workers - AMUEDO); and the Sindicato Nacional de 
Empregados Domésticos (National Union of Domestic Workers - SINED). All three are 
affiliated with organised labour. They inform domestic workers about their rights and 
responsibilities, help them navigate conflict, provide valuable mediation services, and 
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increase the visibility of this historically marginalised sector.  
However workers’ organisations face many constraints. Domestic workers are scared of 
joining unions or associations, and even more scared of talking about it with their 
employers for fear of losing their jobs. Low salaries, an inability to make automatic dues 
deductions, and limited capacity to collect dues from members on a regular basis, means 
that workers’ organisations have difficulty in securing the resources to adequately service 
their members, recruit new members, and follow through on campaign programmes. In 
the context of a fractured labour movement however, domestic worker organising has 
become a battleground for autonomy, power, and resources. It is still too early to know 
whether domestic workers will ultimately benefit.  
 
This study also illustrates that unions are a terrain of struggle and change. More than 
thirty years after independence, informal work in general and domestic work in 
particular, has become a strategic growth area for organised labour. Organising models 
have shifted in response to the realities of intimate work, revitalising the labour 
movement in the process. Taxi ranks, parks and street corners have replaced the factory 
floor as centres of mobilisation and political education. Collective action has been 
redefined to include individual acts of everyday resistance. Tactics have adapted to the 
peculiarities of this sector. Strict interpretations of the class-consciousness have been 
replaced with more fluid conceptions of collective action. After all, as Cobble (2010) 
points out: 
 
What does a fully realized ‘worker consciousness’ look like? Does it require the 
shedding of other desirable identities, such as those tied to household, family and 
community and the development of an autonomous market-based self? And is 
such a narrow and self-interested ‘worker identity’ a necessary precondition for 
collective mobilization? (Cobble 2010, 283) 
 
7.5 For Further Research  
Despite the stigma attached to the occupation, domestic work affords workers a source of 
regular income, some freedom and control over finances, working hours that in relation to 
other professions are compatible with child rearing responsibilities, and opportunities to 
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learn how to do things in a different way - in the middle-class way. Future research would 
benefit from exploring in more depth the discursive forms of power domestic workers 
employ, the contradictions between pleasure and accommodation, resistance and 
acquiescence.  
 
Second, this study was based in Maputo’s cement city, because it is precisely here where 
domestic workers are more likely to be connected to the state apparatus. If labour 
protection had little impact on domestic workers’ working conditions in the cement city, 
it is not likely to have more of an impact in other parts of the city or the country. Future 
research would benefit from an analysis of working conditions that extends beyond 
Maputo to the working class suburbs and rural areas. In this sample domestic workers 
worked on average less hours and received more pay than domestic workers in 
Chipenembe’s (2010) study. Stereotypes suggest that class and cultural differences 
between workers and employers in the suburbs are not as large as in the cement city. 
 
A third limitation is that this study did not interview employers. While Josina eloquently 
argues that it is ultimately up to domestic workers to fight for better working conditions, 
interviews with employers may expose important findings in relation to formalisation in 
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APPENDICES 
 
Appendix 3.1.1: Domestic worker’s interview guide--English 
 
Background: 
• Tell me a little about yourself?  Where were 
you born? What work did your parents do? 
Where did you go to school? 
• How long have you been a domestic worker? 
• Why did you choose to become a domestic 
worker? (Family, migration, etc.) 
• How did you find your current job? 
• Are you a union member? 
• [For union members] When did you join the 
union? 
• [For union members] Why did you choose to 
become a union member?  
• [For union members] How did you get involved 
in the union? 
 
The Act: 
• Did you know that in 2008 the government 
passed an Act giving domestic workers basic 
labour rights?  
• If so, how did you hear about it? 
• Did your employer discuss the content of the 
law with you? If so, what did your employer 
say? 
• The Act stipulates the following conditions. Do 
you have access to these? 
 
Breaks    Salary   
Week-end   Food   
Paid vacation   Regularly paid?  
Paid sick leave   Social Security  
Maternity Leave   Workers Comp 
Hours    Contract   
 
• What do you think are the strengths of the Act? 
• How would you compare your working 
conditions now to how as they were 5 years ago?  
• What do you think has made them change (if 
they have)? 
• Has Act 269 made a difference? 
 
The work: 
• What is it that you like most about domestic 
work?  
• What is it that you like least? 
• How do you think that domestic workers as a 
whole are treated? 
• What are the most common challenges that you 
face? (Wages, insecurity, etc. etc.) 
• Have you had particularly good experiences 
with employers? Example 




• Have you ever experienced tensions or 
conflicts with an employer? 
• [Refer to cards] Using the stages, trace your 
experience in conflict resolution (can do 
multiple). 
• When did the conflict begin? 
• What was the source of the conflict? 
• Who were the actors involved? 
• What strategies did you use? 
• How did the employers respond? 
• Who did you draw support from? 
• How the unions and government agencies 
enable/ constrain improvements?  
• How have you responded to these constraints?  
• What was the outcome of the conflict? 
• How do you feel about this outcome? 
• Rank the cards according to how effective they 
are in improving working conditions for 
domestic workers. Explain 
• Are there are organisational entities or social 
networks missing from this list. If so, what are 
they and what role do they play in your life. 
• Has the way you deal with conflict changed? 
Why? How? 
• What do you think would improve the working 
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Appendix 3.1.2: Domestic worker’s interview guide--Portuguese 
 
Informação geral: 
• Há quanto tempo que você é uma trabalhadora 
doméstica? 
• Por que é que você escolheu formar-se como 
trabalhadora doméstica? 
• Você é um membro de um sindicato? 
• [Para os sindicalistas] Quando é que você ficou 
membro do sindicato? 
• [Para os sindicalistas] Por que que você 
escolheu tornar-se membro do sindicato? 
• [Para os sindicalistas] Como é que você se 
inscreveu no sindicato? 
 
O regulamento: 
• Você sabe que em 2008 o governo 
moçambicano aprovou um regulamento que 
garante certos direitos laborais aos trabalhadores 
domésticos?  
• Se já ouviu falar da lei quem é que informou? 
O empregador, o sindicato, o governo, a 
televisão, amigos, colegas?  
• A lei garante as seguintes condições. Você tem 
acesso a estas? 
 
Intervalo Salário regular 
Dias de Folga Comida 
Férias  Segurança social 
Dias de enfermedade Ajuda médica  
Dias maternidade  Contracto  
Horário de trabalho  
 
• O quê que você acha que são os pontos fortes 
do regulamento? 
• O quê que você acha que são os pontos fracos 
do regulamento?  
• Como você compararia suas condições de 
trabalho agora como elas costumavam ser? Lei 






• O quê que você mais gosta sobre o trabalho 
doméstico? 
• O quê é que você menos gosta? 
• Como é que você acha que os trabalhadores 
domésticos são tratados em geral? 
• Quais são os desafios mais comuns que você 
enfrenta?  
• Você já teve boas experiências com 
empregadores? Pode dar um exemplo. 
• Você já teve experiências más com 
empregadores? Pode dar um exemplo. 
 
Navegando conflito: 
• Você já teve problemas ou conflitos com um 
empregador? 
• Usando os cartões em baixo, pode dar um 
exemplo de como resolveu estes problemas. 
• Quando é que o conflito começou? 
• Qual foi a causa do conflito? 
• Quem eram os atores? 
• Que estratégias e que você usou? 
• Como é que os empregadores respondem? 
• Onde é que você conseguiu receber apoio? 
• Como é que os sindicatos e órgãos 
governamentais ajudaram ou restringiram a sua 
luta? 
• Como é que você respondeu a essas restrições? 
• Qual foi o resultado do conflito? 
• Como é que você se sente sobre esse resultado? 
• Olha outra vez para os cartões. Quais foram as 
instituições (formais ou não) que foram mais 
eficazes em termos de melhorar as suas 
condições de trabalho. 
• Existem outras entidades ou redes sociais 
importante que forma excluídas da lista? Em 
caso afirmativo, quais são, e qual é o papel que 
desempenham na sua vida. 
• A maneira como você lida com o conflito 
mudou? Por quê? Como? 
• O quê que você acha que é necessário para 
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Appendix 3.1.3: Interview guide for labour union/association leaders-- English 
 
The person: 
• How did you get involved in Union? 
 
Union: 
• When was the Union founded?  
• What was the driving force behind the creation 
of the Union? 
• At the time of its founding was the Domestic 
Workers Legislation already being developed? 
• Did the Union receive external help in the early 
stages? From whom?  
• How many members does the Union have? 
Who are they? Where do they live? 
• What is the Union’s structure? How does it 
relate to COMUTRA, OTM and Forum Mulher? 
• What is the strategic program of the 
organisation? 
 
Development of the Domestic Workers 
Legislation: 
• When did the Legislation begin to be 
developed? Was the Union already formed? 
• Who were the main actors? 
• Why did the Union decide to prioritize 
legislative change? 
• Did the Union have other program areas 
concurrently? If so, how did these relate to the 
legislative campaign? 
• What role did the Union play in the passage of 
this legislation? (Drafting, mobilising, lobbying, 
research, etc.) 
• Did the Union receive international support 
(e.g. ILO, WIEGO, DWN, SADSAWU) 
• What was the timeline for the development of 
the legislation?  
• What changes did the Labour Ministry and the 
National Assembly make? Why? Did you agree 
with these changes? Were they contentious?  
 
Impact of the Legislation: 
• In your opinion what are the principle strengths 
of the legislation? 
• What are the main weaknesses of the 
legislation? How important are these 
weaknesses? 
• Has the union attempted to compensate for 
these weaknesses in any way? If so, how? 
• The legislation initially included a minimum 
wage but this was removed. Why was that the 
case? Do you think this is a serious obstacle to 
improving the working conditions of domestic 
workers? 
• The legislation does not require a contract? 
What is the rationale behind this clause? 
• The legislation requires that domestic workers 
remain respectful and loyal to employees. This is 
rather unusual language. Was this language 
incorporated into the legislation from the outset 
or was it added as part of a compromise. Please 
explain. 
• What is the enforcement structure that has been 
put in place? 
• Where is the enforcement structure strongest? 
• Where is the enforcement structure weakest? 
 
Leveraging the Legislation 
• How has the Union used this legislation to 
improve to conditions of work for domestic 
workers? 
• Did the Union organise awareness-raising 
campaigns during and after the elaboration of the 
law? How and where did these take place? Are 
these on-going? Do they have alternative 
purposes? (E.g. Membership recruitment and 
development) How successful have they been? 
• Has the Union taken on individual employers? 
If so, how? 
• Does the Union provide legal services? Do you 
partner with legal service providers such as 
MULEIDE and Liga dos Direitos Humanos? 
How does this partnership work? 
• Does the Union mobilize members for 
collective action? If so, how, what is the 
frequency, what kinds of action? 
• [For AMUEDO] AMUEDO recently started a 
domestic workers agency. How does it work? 
What are the benefits, challenges, etc? 
• This month the ILO approved the convention 
for Domestic Workers. What significance do you 
think this convention has for Mozambican 
domestic workers in particular. What are the next 
steps for the Union? 
• What do you think is the significance of the 
Union for the Mozambican labour movement? 
What is your relationship like with OTM and 
COMUTRA? 
• What do you think is the significance of the 
Union for Mozambican women workers? 
• What have been some of the challenges to the 
continued growth and development of the 
Union? 
• How is AMUEDOs work funded? 
 
• Next steps: Contact requests, visits and 
upcoming events, documents.
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Appendix 3.1.4: Interview guide for labour union/association leaders —Portuguese 
 
• Como juntou-se ao movimento laboral?  
 
Sindicato:  
• Quando foi fundado o Sindicato?  
• Qual foi a força motriz da criação do 
Sindicato?  
• Na época de sua fundação, a Legislação 
Nacional dos Trabalhadores já tinha sido 
elaborada?   
• Quantos membros tem o Sindicato? Quem são? 
Onde vivem?  
• Qual é a estrutura do Sindicato? Como 
relacionam com a COMUTRA, OTM e Fórum 
Mulher?  
• Qual é o programa estratégico da organização?  
 
Elaboração da Legislação Nacional dos 
Trabalhadores Domésticos:  
• Quando é que a legislação foi elaborada?  
• Qual foi o processo de elaboração? 
• Quais eram os atores principais?  
• Quais foram os grandes debates e alterações? 
• Sente-se satisfeito com o resultado?  
• Por que o Sindicato decidiu priorizar esta ação 
legislativa?  
• Quais são as outras áreas de trabalho do 
sindicato? Como relacionam com a campanha 
legislativa?  
• Qual foi o papel do Sindicato na elaboração 
desta legislação? 
• O Sindicato recebeu ajuda externa (por 
exemplo, da OIT, WIEGO, DWN, SADSAWU)? 
 
Impacto da Legislação:  
• Na sua opinião quais são os pontos mais fortes 
em relação a legislação?  
• Quais são as principais deficiências da 
legislação? Quão importante são estes pontos 
fracos?  
• A legislação incluiu inicialmente um salário 
mínimo, mas foi retirado. Porque? Qual será o 
impacto nas condições de trabalho dos 
empregados domésticos?  
• A legislação não exige um contrato? Qual é a 
lógica atrás desta cláusula?  
• Qual é a estrutura de fiscalização?  
• Onde é que a estrutura é mais forte?  
• Onde é a mais fraca?  
 
Aproveitando a Legislação  
• Como é que o Sindicato aproveita esta lei?  
• O Sindicato organizou campanhas de 
sensibilização durante e após a elaboração da 
lei?  
• Já enfrentaram empregadores?  
• O Sindicato presta ajuda jurídica? Tem uma 
parceria com prestadores de serviços jurídicos? 
Como funciona essa parceria?  
• O Sindicato mobilizar os membros para a ação 
coletiva? Se sim, como, qual é a frequência, que 
tipo de ação?  
• [Para Amuedo] Amuedo iniciou recentemente 
uma agência de trabalhadores domésticos. Como 
funciona? Quais são os benefícios, desafios, etc?  
• Este mês a OIT aprovou a convenção para os 
trabalhadores domésticos. Qual e a importância 
desta convenção para os trabalhadores 
domésticos? Quais são os próximos passos para 
o Sindicato?  
• Qual e o papel do seu Sindicato dentro do 
movimento laboral moçambicano? Qual é o seu 
relacionamento com a OTM e COMUTRA?  
• Qual e a importância do Sindicato para as 
mulheres moçambicanas?  
• Quais são os desafios para o crescimento e 
sustentabilidade do Sindicato?  
• Próximos passos: pedidos contato, visitas e 
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Appendix 3.1.5: Interview guide for legal service providers--English 
 




• Most common problems 
• Most active sectors 
 
Do you handle domestic workers cases? 
• How many? 
• What are the most common problems? 
 
Describe and evaluate the process for problem resolution (letter, meeting, COMAL, courts). 
• What happens if the employer doesn’t show up to the mediation or follow through? What did you 
do before COMAL was created? 
• How would you evaluate COMAL?  
• How would you evaluate the courts? 
• What is the most common outcome in domestic workers’ cases? 
 
Evaluation of Act 269: 
• Strengths of the regulation 
• Weaknesses of the regulation 
• Where is the enforcement structure strongest? 
• Where are there challenges with the enforcement structure? 
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Appendix 3.1.6: Interview guide for legal service providers—Portuguese 
 




• Problemas mais comuns, em geral 
• Os sectores de trabalho mais comuns 
 
Você já lidou com casos de trabalhadores domésticos? 
• Quantos? 
• Quais são os problemas mais comuns? 
 
Descreve e avalia o processo de resolução de conflitos (reunião, carta, COMAL, tribunais). 
• O que você fez antes COMAL foi criado? 
• O que acontece se o empregador não atende à mediação?  
• Como avaliaria o COMAL? 
• Como avaliaria Secção Laboral dos tribunais? 
• Qual é o resultado mais comum de mediação nos casos dos empregados domésticos? 
 
Avaliação da Lei 269: 
• Pontos fortes do regulamento 
• Pontos Fracos do regulamento 
• Onde é que a estrutura de execução e mais forte? 
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Appendix 3.1.7: Interview guide for domestic workers’ agencies--English 
 
History 
• Can you tell me a little bit about why and how you founded this agency? 
• When was it founded? 
• By whom was it founded? 
• What are the functions of the agency? 
 
Job Placement: 
• Do you do job placement? 
• If so, how many clients do you have? How many of these are looking for domestic workers? 
• What is the process for placing domestic workers? 
• Who negotiates working conditions with the employer? Are there minimum standards? 
• Do you have a contract? 
 
The Regulation: 
• Do you know that in 2008 the government passed an act giving domestic workers basic rights? 
• How did you hear about it? 
• Has the Act impacted your work? 
• What do you think are the strengths of the act? 
• What do you think are the weaknesses of the act? 
• What happens if a worker is abused in her job, not paid, etc.? 
• Do you collaborate with a union or association? 
 
Collaborating with Unions: 
• Previously, you had some kind of connection with the union? What was that relationship that you 
had? 
• How was that relationship formed? 
• Why did you form that relationship? 
• Do you still work together? 
• What are the disadvantages of working with the union? 
• What are the advantages of working with the union? 
 
Training 
• Do you provide training? 
• If yes, what types of training do you offer?  
• How many people do you train a month? 
• How many of these are domestic workers? 
• What is the curriculum for training domestic workers? 
• Do you include “know your rights” classes in your curriculum? 
• What happens after the end of the training program? 
 
Recruitment: 
• How do you recruit domestic workers? 
• How to you recruit employers 
• Where do you advertise? 
• Why do domestic workers come to the agency? 
 
Concluding question: 
• How do you think domestic workers are treated in general?  








	   91	  
Appendix 3.1.8: Interview guide for domestic workers’ agencies--Portuguese 
 
História 
• Pode me contar um pouco sobre como fundou esta agência? 
• Quando foi fundada? 
• Por quem foi fundada? 
• Quais são as funções da agência? 
 
Colocação de trabalho: 
• Você faz a colocação de trabalho? 
• Se sim, quantos clientes tem? Quantos deles estão à procura de trabalhadores domésticos? 
• Qual é o processo de colocação de trabalhadores domésticos? 
• Quem negocia condições de trabalho com o empregador? Existem requisitos mínimos? 
• Você tem um contrato? 
 
O regulamento: 
•  Sabia que em 2008 o governo aprovou um regulamento para os trabalhadores domésticos? 
•  Se sim, como? 
• O regulamento teve algum impacto sobre o seu trabalho? 
• Quais são os pontos fortes do regulamento? 
• Quais são os pontos fracos do regulamento? 
• Se um trabalhador não é pago, é despedido sem justa causa, etc. o que acontece?  
• Colabora com um sindicato ou associação?  
• sQuais são as desvantagens de trabalhar com o sindicato? 
• Quais são as vantagens de trabalhar com o sindicato? 
• Colaboraria? Por que? Por que não?  
 
Formação  
• Você oferece formação?  
• Se sim, quais são os tipos de formação que oferece? 
• Quantas pessoas forma dentro de um mês? 
• Quantos são trabalhadores domésticos? 
• Qual é o currículo de formação de trabalhadores domésticos? 
• Você inclui formação sobre os direitos no currículo? 
• O que acontece após o fim do programa de formação? 
 
Recrutamento: 
• Como recruta trabalhadores domésticos? 
• Como recruta empregadores? 
• Onde anunciar? 
• Por que que os trabalhadores domésticos vêm para a agência? 
 
Conclusão: 
• Como acha que os trabalhadores domésticos são tratados em Moçambique?  
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Appendix 3.1.9: Interview guide for government officials--English 
 
• How did you become a [labour inspector, mediator]?  
 
• How long have you been a [labour inspector, mediator]? 
 
• Tell me about the [inspectorate, COMAL]: 
o Role 
o When was it set up? Was it affected by the labour law changes? 
o  How many employees are there? 
o How does this fit within the broader MITRAB structure? 
 
• What does an average day look like for you? 
 
• Cases: 
o Number of cases 
o Types of cases 
o Most active cases 
o # of domestic worker cases 
 
• What is the process for problem resolution (trace the different stages)?  
o Is this different for domestic workers? 
 
• The new labour law 23/2007 introduced the concept of an institution for mediation and arbitration.  
o [For inspectorate] Did this change the role of the inspectorate? If so how? 
o When does this process work well?  
o Are there instances where this process works less well? 
 
• The domestic workers regulation was passed in 2008. 
o Were you trained on it? If so, by whom? 
o How has this regulation affected how you deal with domestic workers’ cases? 
o What are the strengths of the regulation? 
o What are the weaknesses of the regulation? 
 
• What do you see as	  the	  biggest	  challenges	  facing	  domestic	  workers?	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Appendix 3.1.10: Interview guide for government officials--Portuguese 
 
Como ficou um [inspetor do trabalho, mediador]?  
 
• Há quanto tempo que e um [inspetor do trabalho, mediador]?  
 
• Como funciona o departamento de [inspeção, COMAL]:  
• Papel? 
• Quando foi criado?  
• Quantos funcionários tem?  
• Como relaciona com outras estruturas dentro do MITRAB? 
 
• O que e um dia normal para você?  
 
• Casos:  
• o número de casos  
• tipos de o de casos 
• casos mais comuns 
• n º de casos de trabalhadores domésticos  
 
• Qual é o processo para a resolução de problemas? 
 
• Este processo é diferente para os trabalhadores domésticos?  
 
• O regulamento de trabalhadores domésticos foi aprovado em 2008.  
 
• Você recebeu alguma formação? Se afirmativo, por quem?  
• Qual foi um impacto do regulamento no processo de resolução de problemas?  
• Quais são os pontos fortes do regulamento?  
• Quais são os pontos fracos do regulamento?  
 
 
• A nova lei laboral 23/2007 introduziu o conceito do COMAL.  
 
• A criação da COMAL mudou o papel desta instituição? Se sim, como?  
• Quando é que este processo funciona bem?  
•  Existem casos quando este processo não funciona tão bem? 
 
• Quais são os maiores desafios que enfrentam os trabalhadores domésticos?  
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Appendix 3.2.1: Sample informed consent form--English  
 
Informed Consent Form 
 
(To be read out by researcher before the beginning of the interview. One copy of the form to be left 
with the respondent; one copy to be signed by the respondent and kept by the researcher.) 
 
My name is Ruth Castel-Branco (student number 211551606). I am doing research on a project entitled 
‘Legislating worker justice? The role of the state in formalising and strengthening domestic workers’ 
rights’. This project is supervised by Professor Francie Lund at the School of Development Studies, 
University of KwaZulu-Natal. I am managing the project and should you have any questions my 
contact details are:  
 
School of Development Studies, University of KwaZulu-Natal, Durban OR Instituto de Estudos Sociais 
e Economicos –Maputo/Mozambique. Cell: 00258 8221462198. Email: ruthcastelbranco@gmail.com 
or 211551606@ukzn.ac.za.   
 
Thank you for agreeing to take part in the project. Before we start I would like to emphasize that: 
-your participation is entirely voluntary; 
-you are free to refuse to answer any question; 
-you are free to withdraw at any time. 
 
The interview will be kept strictly confidential and will be available only to members of the research 
team. Excerpts from the interview may be made part of the final research report. Do you give your 
consent for: (please tick one of the options below) 
 
Your name, position and organisation, or  
Your position and organisation, or  
Your organisation or type of organisation (please specify), or  
None of the above  
 
to be used in the report? 
 
Please sign this form to show that I have read the contents to you. 
 
----------------------------------------- (signed) ------------------------ (date) 
 
----------------------------------------- (print name) 
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Appendix 3.2.2: Sample informed consent form--Portuguese  
 
 
Ficha de autorização 
 
(Para ser lido pelo pesquisador antes do início da entrevista, e assinado pelo entrevistado. Pode deixar 
uma cópia com o entrevistado). 
 
Chamo-me Ruth Castel-Branco e sou estudante de Mestrado no Departamento de Estudos de 
Desenvolvimento da Universidade de KwaZulu-Natal, Durban, África do Sul (número de aluno 
211551606). Estou a fazer uma pesquisa sobre a formalização do trabalho doméstico em Moçambique. 
A minha supervisora é a Dra. Francie Lund.  
 
Obrigado pela sua participação neste projeto. Antes de começarmos, eu gostaria de enfatizar que: 
-a sua participação é voluntária; 
-você pode recusar responder qualquer pergunta; 
-você pode  retirar-se a qualquer momento. 
 
Se você tiver qualquer dúvida os meus contactos são: 
 Celular: 00258 8221462198.  
 E-mail: ruthcastelbranco@gmail.com ou 211551606@ukzn.ac.za. 
 
A entrevista será confidencial. Partes da entrevista podem ser incluídas no relatório final. Você 
autoriza-nos a: (assinale uma das opções abaixo) 
 
_ Identificar o seu nome, cargo e organização, ou 
_ Identificar a sua posição e organização, ou 
_ Identificar a sua organização ou tipo de organização, ou 
_ Nenhuma das alternativas acima. 
 
Por favor, assina este formulário, autoriza esta entrevista. 
 
----------------------------------------- (Assinado) ------ ------------------ (data) 
 
----------------------------------------- (Imprimir o nome) 
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Appendix 3.3.1: Sample interview request letter--English 
 
Date: [June 12, 2012] 
 
SUBJECT: AUTHORISATION REQUEST  
 
Honourable [Doctor Judge of the Court of Judicial Maputo City]: 
  
I hereby would like to request permission to observe the procedures of the judicial court of the city of 
Maputo-Labour Section. This observation is part of my Master's thesis, which focuses on the 
formalisation of domestic work in Mozambique.  
 
The aim of this thesis is to develop recommendations for trade unions, nongovernmental organisations 
and public officials engaged in the formalisation of this sector in other countries.  
 
I will examine three key questions:  
 
1. What is the institutional framework for the formalisation of domestic work?  
2. How do domestic workers use these institutions to promote their interests?  
3. What are the informal strategies do domestic workers use to improve their working conditions?  
 
The research will be conducted in the second half of 2011 and will include among others, interviews 
with AMUEDO, SINED, AEDOMO, the Inspector General's work, Arbitration and Mediation Centre, 
and 12 interviews with domestic workers.  
 
Your cooperation is greatly appreciated. If you have any questions, please contact Ruth Castel-Branco, 
+258 82 146 2198, or ruthcastelbranco@gmail.com.  
 
Participation in this research is voluntary. All information will be confidential. You may receive a copy 






Ruth Castel-Branco  
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Appendix 3.3.2: Sample interview request-- Portuguese 
 
Data: [12 de Junho de 2012] 
 
ASSUNTO: PEDIDO AUTORIZAÇÃO  
 
Meritíssimo [Doutor Juiz de Direito do Tribunal Judicial da Cidade de Maputo]: 
 
Pela presente gostaria de pedir autorização para observar os procedimentos do tribunal judicial da 
cidade de Maputo— secção laboral.  
 
Esta observação faz parte da minha tese de mestrado, cujo foco é a formalização do trabalho doméstico 
em Moçambique.  
 
O objectivo da tese é a elaboração de recomendações para sindicatos, organizações não-
governamentais e funcionários públicos, engajados na formalização deste sector em outros países.  
 
Vou examinar três questões fundamentais: 
1. Qual é o contexto institucional para a formalização do trabalho doméstico? 
2. Como é que os trabalhadores domésticos utilizam estas instituições para promover os seus 
interesses? 
3. Quais são as estratégias, fora das instituições formais, que os trabalhadores domésticos usam 
para melhorar as suas condições de trabalho? 
A pesquisa será realizada na ultima metade de 2011 e incluirá entre outras, entrevistas com a 
AMUEDO, SINED, AEDOMO, o Inspetor-geral de trabalho, o Centro de Mediação e Arbitragem e 12 
entrevistas com trabalhadoras domésticas. 
 
A sua cooperação é amplamente apreciada. Caso tenha alguma questão, por favor contacte Ruth Castel-
Branco, +258 82 146 2198, ou ruthcastelbranco@gmail.com.  
 
A participação nesta investigação é voluntária. Toda informação será anónima. Poderá receber uma 





































     
A MINHA PATROA E 0 MEU PATRAO DEVEM: 
a) Pagar-me pantualmente o sal6rio combinada; 
b) Tratar-me gentilmente e fomecer-me condi~oes 
e meios necess6rios para as me us trabafhos; 
c) Dar-me todo a assistencia medico e 
medicamentosa par acidente de trabafho ou 
doen~a causada pefo trabolho e; 
d) Pagar-me sempre uma indemniza~oo quando 
devida. 
SAO DIREITOS DA MINHA PATROA/PATRAO: 
i. Exigir·me que fa~a to do o trobalho combinada; 
ii. Fiscalizar como fa~o o meu trabolho; 
iii. lndicar-me as medidas de higiene e de 
seguran~a na residencia e como prevenir 
acidentes de trabalho e doen~as que possam 
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SOU EMPREGADA DOMESTICA, 
PRESTO TRABALHO 
NA HABITA~O E NA RESIDENCIA 
DE QUALOUER PESSOA 
SAO MEUS DIREITOS: 
Receber o valor combinado pelo meu 
trabalho; 
Gozar o descanso semanal e as 
feriados sem me descontarem do 
sa/aria; 
Ter assistencia medica e 
medicamentosa em casas de 
acidente de trabalho ou doen~a 
causada pelo meu tipo de traba/ho; 
Ser tratada com gentileza e com 
respeito; 
lnscrever-me na seguran~a social 
obrigatoriamente; 
Ter um contrato de trabalho escrito, 




Rua Vila Namuoli, n°246, 
Bairra da Malhangalene. 




Av. Albert Lithulli, "'941-R/C, 
Boirro do Alto Moe. 
Telefax: +25821400888 
Ce/.82 5721265 
Maputo - M~ombique 
SAO MIN HAS OBRIGA<;AOES: 
Chegar sempre a horas ao local de 
trabalho; 
Cumprir o trabalho e ser sempre 
honesto; 
Obedecer e respeitar todas as 
pessoas que vivem ou estejam de 
passagem no residencia; 
Ter a maior aten~ao na higiene 
e na seguran~a do trabalho de 
acordo com as recomenda~oes da 
patroa/ patrao; 
Ser honesto e cortes (educada) com 
os restantes empregados da 
residencia para nao prejudicar 0 
trabalho e a vida domestica; 
lefor pe/os interesses da 
patroa/ patrao; 
Em casas de constatar que h6 perigo 
devo jazer tudo para o evitar; 
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